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CALIFORNIA COMMENTARY ON THE
RESTATEMENT OF THE LA W THIRD,
SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY
The UCC Committee of the Business Law Section
of the State Bar of California-
INTRODUCTION
The American Law Institute published the Restatement of the
Law Third, Suretyship and Guaranty in 1996 (Restatement of Surety-
ship). The Restatement of Suretyship is the most modem study of the
subject. Its text, supplemented by Comments, Illustrations, and Re-
porter's Notes, provides the best available analysis of law and policy
in this field.
While California law on the subject is formally codified, in fact
this area of California law is primarily developed and embodied in
judicial decisions. The statutory coverage, found in sections 2787
through 2856 of the Civil Code, was originally enacted in 1872. See
Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2787-2856 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000). It was
based on the Field Code, itself based on the common law. See Cal.
Civ. Code § 2787 (West 1986); Bloom v. Bender, 48 Cal. 2d 793,
802, 313 P.2d 568, 573 (1957); see also Li i'. Yellow Cab Co., 13
Cal 3d 804, 814-15, 532 P.2d 1226, 1233-34, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858,
865-66 (1975). This was recognized in Mead v. Sanwa Bank Cali-
fornia, 61 Cal. App. 4th 561, 570, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 625, 630 (1998),
the first California appellate case to refer (in footnote 2) to the Re-
statement of Suretyship ("In 1872, the Legislature codified the com-
* This Report has been a project of the Committee carried out over sev-
eral years. Because it reflects the collective work of many individuals, in-
cluding past as well as current members of the Committee, the Report is not
signed by the current Committee membership or by individual contributors.
Nonetheless, the Committee gratefully acknowledges the specific contributions
of current Committee members Harry C. Sigman and Ellen H. Friedman and
former Committee members George P. Haley and Gino Chilled.
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mon-law rule in the form of Civil Code section 2832."). Hence, al-
though to a great extent provided for in statutory text (last signifi-
cantly subjected to general legislative modification in 1939), modem
suretyship law in California is essentially reflected in judicial deci-
sions. Thus, the common law of suretyship continues to be signifi-
cantly relevant in California.
Shortly after their initial adoption, the Restatements have been
an important source of authority and guidance for the California
courts. In 1934, the California Supreme Court felt warranted in re-
laxing a rule stated in one of its prior decisions "because this subject
has had thorough consideration by law collaborators as shown by the
recent product of the American Law Institute, styled: 'Restatement
of the Law--Agency. ... "' Speck v. Wylie, 1 Cal. 2d 625, 627, 36
P.2d 618, 619 (1934).
Five years later, the Supreme Court explained in greater detail
the Restatements' position as authority in this state:
Although it is true ... that the restatement does not consti-
tute a binding authority, considering the circumstances un-
der which it has been drafted, and its purposes, in the ab-
sence of a contrary statute or decision in this state, it is
entitled to great consideration as an argumentative author-
ity. It purports to accurately reflect the general common
law of the United States, and where there is a conflict, to
state the general and better rule on any given subject. For
these reasons, in the absence of contrary authority in this
state, ... and in view of the soundness of the doctrine an-
nounced, we are inclined to and do follow the rule an-
nounced in [Restatement of the Law of Trusts] section 155.
Canfield v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 13 Cal. 2d 1, 30-31, 87 P.2d
830, 844-45 (1939).
California Court of Appeal decisions have cited Canfield in
adopting Restatements as California law. See Standard Oil Co. v.
Oil, Chem. &Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 23 Cal. App. 3d 585, 589,
100 Cal. Rptr. 354, 356 (1972) (adopting the Restatement of Restitu-
tion); Hawkins v. Oakland Title Ins. & Guar. Co., 165 Cal. App. 2d
116, 125-26, 331 P.2d 742, 747-48 (1958) (adopting the Restatement
of Torts); Karapetian v. Carolan, 83 Cal. App. 2d 344, 348-50, 188
P.2d 809, 811-13 (1948) (adopting the Restatement of Contracts and
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the Restatement of Restitution); Scholey v. Steele, 59 Cal. App. 2d
402, 405, 138 P.2d 733, 734-35 (1943) (adopting the Restatement oJ
Torts).
Modem California decisions have taken for granted the Re-
statements' role as leading and persuasive authority, citing and fol-
lowing the applicable Restatement section without stopping to ex-
plain why it is proper to look to the Restatement as a source of
California law. See, e.g., Rosenthal i Great W. Fin. Sec. Coip., 14
Cal. 4th 394, 420-23, 926 P.2d 1061, 1075-78, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 875,
890-92 (1996) (Restatement Second of Contracts); Bily v. Arthur
Young & Co., 3 Cal. 4th 370, 408-14, 834 P.2d 745, 768-73, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 51, 74-79 (1992) (Restatement Second of Torts); Garcia v.
Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 728, 734-36, 789 P.2d 960, 963-65, 268
CaL Rptr. 779, 782-84 (1990) (Restatement Second of Torts); Bloom
v. Bender, 48 CaL 2d 793, 798-800, 313 P.2d 568, 571-73 (1957)
(Restatement of Security).
California has also followed the Restatements in the field of
suretyship law. See, e.g., Bloom v. Bender, 48 Cal. 2d 793, 313 P.2d
568 (1957). This is true even though many legal principles of sure-
tyship law are codified in the California Civil Code. With a few ex-
ceptions, such as section 2856 which concerns waiver of suretyship
rights and defenses, the Civil Code sections on suretyship have sur-
vived essentially unchanged from their original enactment as part of
the 1872 Civil Code.
As the California Supreme Court has explained, the 1872 Civil
Code was, in effect, the Restatement of its day, organizing and con-
cisely restating the case and statutory law of that time. See Liv. Yel-
low Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 814-15, 532 P.2d 1226, 1232-34, 119
Cal. Rptr. 858, 865-66 (1975). In enacting this proto-Restatement as
the law of California, "it was not the intention of the Legislature to
•.. insulate the matters therein expressed from further judicial devel-
opment; rather it was the intention of the Legislature to announce
and formulate existing common law principles and definitions for
purposes of orderly and concise presentation and with a distinct view
toward continuing judicial evolution." Id. at 814, 532 P.2d at 1233,
119 Cal. Rptr. at 865; see also L J Weinrot & Son, Inc. v. Jackson,
40 Cal. 3d 327, 332, 708 P.2d 682, 685, 220 Cal. Rptr. 103, 106
(1985).
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The California Supreme Court buttressed this belief on earlier
precedent:
The Civil Code was not designed to embody the whole law
of private and civil relations, rights, and duties; it is incom-
plete and partial; and except in those instances where its
language clearly and unequivocally discloses an intention to
depart from, alter, or abrogate the common-law rule con-
cerning a particular subject matter, a section of the code
purporting to embody such doctrine or rule will be con-
strued in the light of common-law decisions on the same
subject.
In reEstate of Elizalde, 182 Cal. 427, 433, 188 P. 560, 562 (1920).
The Restatement of Suretyship, like its predecessor, the Re-
statement of Security, and like the Restatements of other subjects,
shows how "common-law decisions on the same subject" have
evolved and like its predecessors, gives California courts valuable
guidance in construing the Civil Code in light of modem notions of
suretyship law. Given the importance of certainty and predictability
in commercial law and the importance of uniformity in a national
economy, future judicial development of California suretyship law
should be powerfully influenced by the Restatement of Suretyship.
Therefore, the UCC Committee has prepared this Report as a service
to the California bench and bar in order to provide a convenient
comparison of the Restatement of Suretyship with current California
law.
STATUTORY CROSS-REFERENCES
January 25, 2000
The following table cross-references those sections of the Cali-
fornia Civil Code dealing with suretyship to corresponding sections
of the Restatement of Suretyship. Where there is no direct corre-
spondence between the Civil Code and the Restatement of Surety-
ship, the table attempts to identify sections or comments to sections
of the Restatement of Suretyship that deal with analogous issues,
whether or not the Civil Code and Restatement of Suretyship are in
agreement on these issues.
CALIFORNA COMMENTARY
TABLE
CALIFORNIA L E RESTA T fENT TITLE
CIVL CODE OFSURETSHIP
§ 2787 Former distinctions §§ 1(1), 2 15 Scope; Transactions Giving
abolished; Surety or Rise to Suretyship Status;
guarantor defined; Contract Creating the Sec-
Guaranties of col- ondary Obligation; Inter-
lection; Continuing pretation of the Secondary
guaranties Obligation-Use of Par-
ticular Terms
§ 2788 Surety without §§ l(3)(d), 2(a), Scope; Transactions Giving
knowledge or con- 20 Rise to Suretyship Status;
sent ofprincipal Contract Creating the Sec-
ondary Obligation; When
Principal Obligor Is
Charged with Notice of
Secondary Obligation
§ 2792 Consideration § 9 Consideration
§ 2793 Writing, signature § 11(1) Statute of Frauds
§ 2794 Original obligations § 11(2)-(3) Statute of Frauds
not requiring a
writing
§ 2795 Acceptance of offer, § 8 When Notification of Ac-
notice ceptancc of the Secondary
Obligor's Offer is Neces-
sary for Creation of the
Secondary Obligation
§ 2799 Incomplete contract; § 14 Interpretation of the Secon-
implied terms dary Obligation-Generally
§ 2800 Guaranty that obli- § 15(b) Interpretation of the Secon-
gation is good or dary Obligation--Use of
collectible Particular Terms
§ 2801 Guaranty that obli- §§ 50, 15(b) Effect on Secondary Obli-
gation is good or gation of Obligec's Lack of
collectible; recovery Action to Enforce Underly-
I ing Obligation; Interprcta-
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CALIFORNIA RESTATEMENTCII OE TITLE RTITLEEN
CIVIL CODE OF SURETYSHIP
tion of the Secondary Obli-
gation-Use of Particular
Terms
§ 2802 Guaranty that obli- § 15(b)(3) Interpretation of the Secon-
gation is good or dary Obligation-Use of
collectible; surety's Particular Terms
liability
§ 2806 Conditional and un- § 1(3)(c) Scope; Transactions Giving
conditional obliga- Rise to Suretyship Status
tions
§ 2807 Surety for payment § 1(2) Scope; Transactions Giving
or performance; li- Rise to Suretyship Status
ability without de-
mand or notice
§ 2808 Surety upon condi- N/A No directly corresponding
tional obligation; or analogous section in the
notice of default Restatement ofSuretvship
§ 2809 Surety's obligation § I comment Scope; Transactions Giving
commensurate with (k)(21) Rise to Suretyship Status
principal obligation
§ 2810 Surety's obligation; §§ 19(b), 34 Suretyship Status--De-
principal's personal fenses of Secondary Obligor
disability Against Obligee; When De-
fenses of Principal Obligor
May Be Raised by Secon-
dary Obligor as Defenses to
Secondary Obligation
§ 2811 Bonded principal; N/A No directly corresponding
agreement with or analogous section in the
surety, deposit of Restatement of Suretvship
money, assets, with-
drawals
§ 2814 Definition § 16 Continuing Guaranty
§ 2815 Revocation § 16 Continuing Guaranty
§ 2819 Change of original §§ 37, 39(b)(ii), Impairment of Suretyship
I obligation; suspen- 39(c)(iii), 41, 48 Status; Release of Underly-
CALIFORNIA COMMENTARY
CALIFORNIA TITLE RESTATFM TIENL
CIVIL CODE OFSUrETYsMP
sion or impairment ing Obligation; Modifica-
of remedies or rights tion of Underlying Obliga-
against principal tion; Waiver of Suretyship
Defenses; Consent
§ 2820 Suspension or im- N/A No directly corresponding
pairment of remedy, or analogous section in the
Creditor's void Restatement ofSure4,ship
promise
§ 2821 Rescission of N/A No directly corresponding
agreement altering or analogous section in the
obligation or im- Restatement ofSure.'yship
pairing remedy
§ 2822 Partial satisfaction § 39(c) Release of Underlying Ob-
of obligation; effect ligation
on obligation of
surety
§ 2823 Delay in proceeding § 50 Effect on Secondary Obli-
by creditor gation of Obligee's Lack of
Action to Enforce Underly-
ing Obligation
§ 2824 Indemnified surety;, § 41(b)(i) Modification of Underlying
liability notwith- Obligation
standing modifica-
tion or release
§ 2825 Discharge of princi- §§ 19(b), 34, 50 Suretyship Stas-
pal Defenses of Secondary Ob-
ligor Against Obligec;
When Defenses of Principal
Obliger May Be Raised by
Secondary Obligor as De-
fenses to Secondary Obli-
gation; Effect on Secondary
Obligation of Obligee's
Lack of Action to Enforce
Underlying Obligation
§ 2832 Ostensible principal §§ 15(d), 32(2)- Interpretation of the Secon-
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CALIFORNIA TITLERESTATEMENT
CIVIL CODE OF SURETYSHIP
may show suretyship (3) dary Obligation-Use of
Particular Terms; Effect of
Suretyship Status on Duties
of Secondary Obligor and
Obligee; Undisclosed
Suretyship Status and
Change in Relationship of
Parties
§ 2837 Rules of interpreta- §§ 5, 14,49 Applicability of General
tion Legal Principles; Interpre-
tation of the Secondary Ob-
ligation--Generally, Burden
of Persuasion With Respect
to Impairment of Recourse
§ 2838 Judgement against § 68 Preclusive Effect on Princi-
surety, effect on re- pal Obligor of Litigation
lationship of parties Between Obligec and See-
ondary Obligor
§ 2839 Exoneration by per- §§ 19(a), (d), 46 Suretyship Status--De-
formance or offer of fenses of Secondary Obligor
performance Against Obligee; Tender of
Performance
§ 2845 Requiring creditor to §§ 50-51 Effect on Secondary Obli-
pursue certain reme- gation of Obligee's Lack of
dies; exoneration of Action to Enforce Underly-
surety by creditor's ing Obligation; When Obli-
neglect to proceed gee Must First Seek to Col-
lect by Applying Collateral
for Underlying Obligation
§ 2846 Compelling princi- §§ 18, 21 Suretyship Status-Re-
pal to perform course of Secondary Obli-
gor Against Principal Obli-
gor; Principal Obligor's
1 Duty of Performance
§ 2847 Reimbursement of §§ 18, 22-23 Suretyship Status--Re-
surety by principal course of Secondary Obli-
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CALIFORNIA tA TE ME VT TITLECLFRL. TITLE TFSRTLEHI
CIVIL CODE OFSUR__ _S__IP
gor Against Principal Obli-
gor, Duty of Principal Obli-
gor to Reimburse Secondary
Obligor, Measure of Reim-
bursement to Which Secon-
dary Obligor is Entitled
§ 2848 Enforcement of §§ 18(2)(d), 27- Suretyship Status-
creditor's remedies 29, 31, 53(3), 55 Recourse of Secondary Ob-
against principal; ligor Against Principal Ob-
contribution by co- ligor, When Secondary Ob-
sureties ligor Has a Right of
Subrogation; Rights Ob-
tained Through Subroga-
tion; Secondary Obligor
Succeeds to Priority Status
of Obligee; Secondary Ob-
ligor's Right to Return Per-
formance; Obligee's Right
of Set-Off; Distinguishing
Cosuretyship from Sub-
suretyship; Rights Between
Secondary Obligors-Co-
suretyship
§ 2849 Surety entitled to §§ 18(2)(d), 28(c), Suretyship Status--Re-
benefits of securities 42, 55(2) course of Secondary Obli-
for performance gor Against Principal Obli-
gor, When Secondary
Obligor Has a Right of Sub-
rogation; Rights Obtained
Through Subrogation; Im-
pairment of Collateral;
Rights Between Secondary
Obligors-Cosuretyship
§ 2850 Property of principal § 51 When Obligee Must First
first applied to dis- Seek to Collect by Applying
charge of obligation Collateral for Underlying
November 2000] 239
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CALIFORNIA RESTATEMENTTITLETIL
CIVIL CODE OF SURETYSHIP
Obligation
§ 2854 Creditor entitled to § 33 Secondary Obligor's Collat-
benefits of securities eral Available to Obligee
for performance held
by surety
§ 2855 Arbitration award § 67 comment (d) Preclusive Effect on Secon-
against principal; dary Obligor of Litigation
effect on surety Between Obligee and Prin-
cipal Obligor
§ 2856 Waiver of suretyship §§ 6,48 Rules Subject to Agreement
rights and defenses; of Parties; Waiver of Sure-
contract language; tyship Defenses; Consent
effectiveness; appli-
cability, validity of
waivers executed
prior to January 1,
1 _ _ 1 1997 1 1
REPORT
The following Paragraph references are to the Restatement of
Suretyship. The use of the term "Accord" denotes that California
law on a particular topic is generally in accord with the Restate-
ment's position on such topic.
Section 1 - Scope: Transactions Giving Rise to Suretyship
Status
Paragraph (])(a)
Accord: Section 2787 of the California Civil Code
states that "[a] surety or guarantor is one who
promises to answer for the debt, default, or
miscarriage of another, or hypothecates prop-
erty as security therefor." Cal. Civ. Code §
2787 (West Supp. 1999); see also Everts v.
Matteson, 21 Cal. 2d 437, 447, 132 P.2d 476,
482 (1942) ("The suretyship relation... arises
CALIFORNIA COMMENTARY
Paragraph (1)(b)
Accord:
Paragraph (1)(c)
Accord:
Paragraph (2)
Accord:
where two persons are under obligation to the
same obligee, who is entitled to but one per-
formance, as between the two who are bound,
and one of them should ultimately bear the
burden of the obligation.").
The obligee is "entitled to but one perform-
ance." Everts v. Matteson, 21 Cal. 2d 437,
447, 132 P.2d 476, 482 (1942); see Westing-
house Credit Cop. i'. Wolfer, 10 Cal. App. 3d
63, 67, 88 CaL Rptr. 654, 656 (1970).
"The obligor ultimately responsible
debt is the principal [obligor] and the
the surety." Everts v. Matteson, 21
437, 447, 132 P.2d 476, 482 (1942).
for the
other is
Cal. 2d
This subsection discusses the circumstances
under which a secondary obligor might be-
come liable under the secondary obligation.
An example of subparagraph (2)(b)(i) would
occur when the principal and the secondary
obligor are jointly and severally liable to the
obligee. See, e.g., United States Leasing
Corp. v. DuPont, 69 Cal. 2d 275, 278, 444
P.2d 65, 67, 70 Cal. Rptr. 393, 395 (1968)
(Secondary obligors of a lease "guarantee and
promise, 'on demand.., to pay.., all rents
and all other sums... in the amounts.., and
in the manner set forth in the Lease.... '").
See Revised U.C.C. § 9-102(71) (1999) (stat-
ing that a person is a secondary obligor if ob-
ligation is secondary or the obligor has a right
of recourse against the debtor or another obli-
gor). Revised division 9 of the California
Commercial Code which was enacted on Oc-
tober 10, 1999, and will take effect July 1,
2001, contains a similar provision. See Act of
November 2000]
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October 10, 1999, ch. 991, § 35, 1999 Cal.
Legis. Serv. 5749, 5791-92 (West).
An example of the application of subparagraph
(2)(b)(ii) arises when the secondary obligor
agrees to be obligated after default by the
principal obligor. See, e.g., Davenport v.
Stratton, 24 Cal. 2d 232, 236, 149 P.2d 4, 6
(1944) (The secondary obligors of a lease
agreed "that if default shall at any time be
made by [the principal obligor] in the payment
of the rent . . . [the secondary obligors] will
well and truly pay the said rent or any arrears
thereof.. .
Paragraph (3)(a)
Accord: See, e.g., Superior Wholesale Elec. Co. v.
Cameron, 264 Cal. App. 2d 488, 493, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 636, 639 (1968) ("No particular form of
agreement is required to establish a suretyship
contract. So long as the agreement establishes
the intention to create such a contract, no set
words and form are required."); Ingalls v. Bell,
43 Cal. App. 2d 356, 366, 110 P.2d 1068,
1074 (1941) ("As long as the agreement es-
tablished the intention of creating a contract of
guaranty, no set words and form were re-
quired."); see also Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2787,
2793 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999).
Paragraph (3)(b)
Accord: Section 2787 of the California Civil Code
abolishes the distinction between sureties and
guarantors and states that "[t]he terms and
their derivatives, wherever used in this code or
in any other statute or law of this state ...
shall have the same meaning as defined in this
section." Cal. Civ. Code § 2787 (West Supp.
1999); see also Superior Wholesale Elec. Co.
v. Cameron, 264 Cal. App. 2d 488, 493, 70
CALIFORNIA COMMENTARY
Cal. Rptr. 636, 639 (1968) (rejecting the ar-
gument that a guaranty obligation could not
have been intended because the letter in issue
did not contain the word "guarantee"); Ingalls
v. Bell, 43 Cal. App. 2d 356, 366, 110 P.2d
1068, 1074 (1941).
Paragraph (3)(c)
Accord: The California Civil Code contemplates that
valid suretyship obligations can be either con-
ditional or unconditional. For example, Cali-
fornia Civil Code section 2806 states, "[a]
suretyship obligation is to be deemed uncon-
ditional unless its terms import some condition
precedent to the liability of the surety." Cal.
Civ. Code § 2806 (West 1993). California
Civil Code section 2808 establishes rules of li-
ability and notice for conditional suretyship
obligations. See id. § 2808.
Paragraph (3)(d)
Accord: Section 2788 of the California Civil Code
states, "[a] person may become a surety even
without the knowledge or consent of the prin-
cipal." Cal. Civ. Code § 2788 (West 1993);
see also Kelley v. Goldschmnidt, 47 Cal. App.
38, 42, 190 P. 55, 57 (1920).
Paragraph (3)(e)
Accord: One application of this paragraph occurs when
an obligee considers a secondary obligor to be
a principal obligor and is ignorant of the sure-
tyship relationship between the principal and
secondary obligors. That application of this
paragraph is supported by Leeke i: Hancock,
76 Cal. 127, 130, 17 P. 937, 938 (1888) ("One
of the two joint makers of a note may be a
surety only, as between himself and his co-
promisor, and yet, as to the payee, his apparent
and real character be that of principal.").
November 2000]
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Paragraph (3)0
Accord:
See also Cal. Civ. Code § 2832 (West 1993);
Restatement of Suretyship § 32(2) (1996).
California case law supports this paragraph.
For example, deeds of trust are given to ven-
dors of real property to secure payment of the
purchase price. California courts have held
that secondary obligors of such payment obli-
gations are not entitled to the benefits of sec-
tion 580b of the California Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, which bars an action for a deficiency
judgment against the principal obligor after
foreclosure of such a deed of trust. See Cal.
Civ. Proc. Code § 580b (West Supp. 1999);
see also Roberts v. Graves, 269 Cal. App. 2d
410, 415, 75 Cal. Rptr. 130, 134 (1969);
Heckes v. Sapp, 229 Cal. App. 2d 549, 552-53,
40 Cal. Rptr. 485, 487 (1964). The result is a
situation similar to that described in this para-
graph. The liability of the principal obligor is
limited to the value of the property, while the
liability of the secondary obligor is not so lim-
ited-but the payment of the purchase price by
the principal obligor will discharge the secon-
dary obligor of its guaranty of the payment
obligation.
Section 2 - Contract Creating the Secondary Obligation
In general:
Paragraph (a)
Accord:
Under section 2787 of the California Civil
Code, a "surety or guarantor is one who
promises to answer for the debt, default, or
miscarriage of another, or hypothecates prop-
erty as security therefor." Cal. Civ. Code §
2787 (West Supp. 1999).
Section 2788 of the California Civil Code
states that "[a] person may become a surety
244
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Paragraph (b)
Accord:
Paragraph (c)
Accord:
Paragraph (d)
Accord:
even without the knowledge or consent of the
principal." CaL Civ. Code § 2788 ('West
1993). This language encompasses a surety-
ship agreement between the obligee and the
secondary obligor. See id.; see also Kelley i%
Goldschmnidt, 47 Cal. App. 38, 42, 190 P. 55,
57 (1920) (stating that "[a] guaranty is... an
independent contract-that is, entirely inde-
pendent of any contract of debt the payment of
which is thus assured, and it follows that an
action on a guaranty... is upon an independ-
ent contract of the guarantor with which the
principal debtor has nothing to do").
See, e.g., Superior Wzolesale Elec. Co. v.
Cameron, 264 CaL App. 2d 488, 491-92, 70
Cal. Rptr. 636, 639 (1968) (treating letter to
obligee, signed by principal and secondary
obligors, as guaranty).
Section 2787 of the California Civil Code in-
cludes in its definition of a secondary obligor
one who "hypothecates property as security"
for the "debt, default, or miscarriage of an-
other." CaL Civ. Code § 2787 (West Supp.
1999); see also Pearl v. Gen. Motors Accep-
tance Coip., 13 Cal App. 4th 1023, 1028, 16
Cal. Rptr. 2d 805, 807 (1993) (citing Bridge v.
Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 Cal. 774, 783,
141 P. 375, 379 (1914) (treating agreement
under which plaintiff pledged stocks as secu-
rity for debts as a guaranty)).
See, e.g., T&R Painting Constr., Inc. i. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 23 Cal. App. 4th
738, 741-42, 29 CaL Rptr. 2d 199, 200 (1994)
(describing payment-bond agreement between
secondary obligor and contractor under which
November 2000]
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Paragraph (e)
Accord:
Paragraph 69
Accord:
secondary obligor agreed to pay subcontrac-
tors for labor and materials in the event that
contractor failed to do so).
See, e.g., Everts v. Matteson, 21 Cal. 2d 437,
447, 132 P.2d 476, 482 (1942) ("grantee of
real property subject to a mortgage or trust
deed who agrees to pay such indebtedness, be-
comes, as to the mortgagor or trustor, the prin-
cipal debtor of the mortgagee or beneficiary,
and the mortgagor or trustor occupies the rela-
tion of surety"); Westinghouse Credit Corp. v.
Wolfer, 10 Cal. App. 3d 63, 67-68, 88 Cal.
Rptr. 654, 657 (1970) ("When [third person]
assumed appellant's debt . . . , he became the
principal obligor and [appellant] became the
surety."); Parrish v. Greco, 118 Cal. App. 2d
556, 561, 258 P.2d 566, 569 (1953) ("if the
debt be assumed by the grantee he becomes
the principal debtor, while the mortgagor be-
comes the surety" (quoting Brichetto v. Raney,
76 Cal. App. 232, 233, 245 P. 235, 241
(1926))).
California courts view the situation described
in the comment to paragraph (f)-where prop-
erty subject to a mortgage is sold, but the pur-
chaser does not assume the debt-as one in
which the property becomes the principal ob-
ligor and the seller (the mortgagor) becomes
the secondary obligor. See Braun v. Crew,
183 Cal. 728, 731, 192 P. 531, 533 (1920).
Consequently, as the comment to paragraph (f)
states, the purchaser, in effect, "becomes a
principal obligor whose obligation is limited to
the property." Restatement (Third) of Surety-
ship § 1(3)(0 (1995); see also Parrish v.
Greco, 118 Cal. App. 2d 556, 561, 258 P.2d
CALIFORNIA COMMENTARY
566, 569 (1953) ("'[W]here the purchaser or
grantee of the mortgaged property takes it
subject to the mortgage only, there being no
expressed or implied agreement to assume the
mortgage debt, he is bound only to the extent
of the property . . . ."' (quoting Brichetto v.
Rane , 76 Cal App. 232, 233, 245 P. 235, 241
(1926))); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v.
McCracken, 19 Cal App. 2d 239, 240, 65 P.2d
130, 131 (1937) ("[W]here a vendee takes land
subject to a mortgage, the land becomes, so far
as the mortgagor is concerned, as between
him, the creditor, and the vendee, primarily li-
able for the payment of the debt, and the rela-
tion of principal and surety arises, the mortga-
gor being the surety and the land the principal
debtor....").
Section 3 - Wzen Principal Obligor and Secondary Obligor
Are Parties to the Same Contract
Paragraph (1)
Accord:
Paragraph (2)
Accord:
See, e.g., Leeke v. Hancock, 76 Cal. 127, 130,
17 P. 937, 938 (1888) ("One of the two joint
makers of a note may be a surety only, as be-
tween himself and his co-promisor, and yet, as
to the payee, his apparent and real character be
that of principal."); see also Cal. Corn. Code §
3419 (West Supp. 2000).
In the context of secondary obligor bonds re-
quired under California statutes, California
Code of Civil Procedure section 996.410(a)
states that a "beneficiary may enforce the li-
ability on a bond against both the principal and
sureties." Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 996.410(a)
(West Supp. 1999). According to section
996.460(a), the liability of the principal and
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secondary obligors is joint and several. See
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 996.460(a) (West Supp.
2000). However, in view of the holding that
"if losses occur, the surety [on a surety bond]
may recover from its principal," Lumbermens
Mut. Cas. Co. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 128
Cal. App. 3d 764, 769, 180 Cal. Rptr. 546, 550
(1982), the obligations of the principal are the
underlying obligations. As a result, as viewed
by the Restatement of Suretyship, the presence
of the principal obligor on a surety bond does
not add anything to the principal's underlying
obligation.
For an example of the type of arrangement
contemplated in paragraph (2), consider Jen-
sen v. Hugh Evans & Co., 18 Cal. 2d 290, 115
P.2d 471 (1941). In Jensen, the principal was
a trustee who had agreed to administer the
funds of the trust in a particular way. This
was the "separate agreement" contemplated in
paragraph (2). The surety bond agreement
bound the trustee, as principal, and the Fidelity
& Deposit Company of Maryland, as secon-
dary obligor, to pay $50,000 in the event that
the trustee should fail to "honestly and faith-
fully" apply the funds derived from the sale of
shares of beneficial interests in the trust in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the separate
agreement. The underlying obligation, upon
which the payment of the bond was condi-
tioned, was the combination of the separate
agreement and the trustee's undertaking to pay
$50,000 if he failed to "honestly and faith-
fully" discharge his duties under that agree-
ment. See id. at 292, 115 P.2d at 473.
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Section 4- Relationship to Other Law
Paragraph (1)
Accord: Official comment 7 to section 3-419 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (adopted as Cali-
fornia Commercial Code section 3419) states
that the general law of suretyship applies to
the rights of accommodation makers of nego-
tiable instruments except to the extent dis-
placed by the provisions of Article 3. See Cal.
Com. Code § 3419 (West 1964 & Supp.
2000). This position is clarified in commen-
tary number 11 of the Permanent Editorial
Board for the Uniform Commercial Code,
which discusses various questions regarding
the rights of an accommodation maker under
Article 3. See PEB Commentary No. 11, 3 B
U.L.A. 126 (Supp. 1999). California courts,
however, have not decisively stated whether
suretyship law is always preempted by the law
pertaining to negotiable instruments or secured
transactions. In a decision based on the prior
version of California Commercial Code divi-
sion 3, a California court refused to decide
whether the law of negotiable instruments or
of suretyship should apply when an accommo-
dation maker's guaranty was a separate piece
of paper from the underlying note. However,
the court did state in dictum that it had diffi-
culty "accepting the premise that the rights of
one who signs as a guarantor in the note itself
are different from the rights of one who exe-
cutes the guaranty on a different piece of pa-
per." Flojo hIt'l, Inc. v. Lassleben, 4 Cal.
App. 4th 713, 722, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 99, 104
(1992) (declining to decide whether "the rights
of a guarantor are governed by a different code
than the rights of an accommodation party"
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Paragraph (2)
Accord:
because in this case the result was the same
under either law).
California Civil Code section 2787 states that
"[a] letter of credit [as defined in California
Commercial Code § 5102(a)(10)] is not a form
of suretyship obligation." Cal. Civ. Code §
2787 (West Supp. 2000). Under California
Civil Code section 2787, this definition is de-
terminative regardless of whether the en-
gagement is governed by division 5 of the
California Commercial Code.
Section 5 - Applicability of General Legal Principles
Accord: Regarding the general law of contract forma-
tion, the court in R.H. Herron Co. v. Flack, 46
Cal. App. 374, 377, 189 P. 294, 295 (1920),
stated that "[a] contract of guaranty is gov-
erned by the usual rules applicable to contracts
in general with reference to an offer and ac-
ceptance thereof."
Other: California Commercial Code section 1103
states that general principles of law supple-
ment the California Commercial Code unless
displaced by the particular provisions of the
California Commercial Code. See Cal. Com.
Code § 1103 (West 1964).
Section 6 - Rules Subject to Agreement of Parties
Accord: Three sections of the California Civil Code
support this section of the Restatement of
Suretyship where the statutorily provided pro-
tections for secondary obligors can be varied
by consent to actions by the obligee that would
not otherwise be permissible (or would result
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in a defense) and by waiver of rights that the
statutes provide. The first section, section
3268, states that
[e]xcept where it is otherwise de-
clared, the provisions of the fore-
going titles of this part [including
the provisions regarding suretyship
agreements], in respect to the rights
and obligations of parties to con-
tracts, are subordinate to the inten-
tion of the parties . . . ; and the
benefit thereof may be waived by
any party entitled thereto, unless
such waiver would be against pub-
lic policy.
Cal. Civ. Code § 3268 (West 1993). The sec-
ond section supporting the Restatement of
Suretship in this context is section 3513. The
section provides that "[a]ny one may waive
the advantage of a law intended solely for his
benefit. But a law established for a public rea-
son cannot be contravened by a private agree-
ment." Cal. Civ. Code § 3513 (Vest 1997).
The final section of support is section 2856(a),
specifically in reference to suretyship rela-
tions. It states that "[a]ny guarantor or other
surety... may waive ... [t]he guarantor or
other surety's rights of subrogation, reim-
bursement, indemnification, and contribution
and any other rights and defenses that are or
may become available to the guarantor or
other surety by reason of sections 2787 to
2855 [the suretyship provisions in the Civil
Code], inclusive." Cal. Civ. Code § 2856(a)
(West Supp. 2000).
Courts have frequently interpreted one or more
of these provisions to permit parties to con-
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tractually alter the statutory requirements of
the law of suretyship or to waive statutorily
provided rights and defenses. See, e.g., Bloom
v. Bender, 48 Cal. 2d 793, 804, 313 P.2d 568,
575 (1957) (permitting parties to agree by
contract not to terminate liability of secondary
obligor upon discharge of principal obligor,
contrary to dictates of California Civil Code
section 2809); River Bank Am. v. Diller, 38
Cal. App. 4th 1400, 1419, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d
790, 800 (1995) (same); Pearl v. Gen. Motors
Acceptance Corp., 13 Cal. App. 4th 1023,
1030, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 805, 808 (1993) (per-
mitting parties to waive protections of Califor-
nia Civil Code section 2815, which allows
secondary obligor to revoke continuing guar-
anty); People v. Pac. Employers Ins. Co., 36
Cal. App. 3d 296, 300, 111 Cal. Rptr. 350, 352
(1973) (permitting parties to waive termina-
tion provisions for surety bonds found in Cali-
fornia Civil Code section 2851); Brunswick
Corp. v. Hays, 16 Cal. App. 3d 134, 138, 93
Cal. Rptr. 635, 638 (1971) (permitting parties
to waive provisions of California Civil Code
sections 2845 and 2849); Wiener v. Van Win-
kle, 273 Cal. App. 2d 774, 786-87, 78 Cal.
Rptr. 761, 769 (1969) (same); Engelman v.
Bookasta, 264 Cal. App. 2d 915, 916-18, 71
Cal. Rptr. 120, 121-22 (1968) (same). Addi-
tionally, one court in dictum has made the
blanket statement that "[t]he protections of the
Civil Code pertaining to surety contracts may
be.waived." Canadian Cmty. Bank v. Ascher
Findley Co., 229 Cal. App. 3d 1139, 1154, 280
Cal. Rptr. 521, 530 (1991).
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The annotations to section 48 have a more ex-
tensive discussion of the waiver of suretyship
rights and defenses under California law.
Section 7- Formation of the Contract Creating the Secondary
Obligation-Generally
Accord: In R.H. Herron Co. v. Flack, 46 Cal. App.
374, 377, 189 P. 294, 295 (1920), the court
stated that "[a] contract of guaranty is gov-
erned by the usual rules applicable to contracts
in general with reference to an offer and ac-
ceptance thereof."
Section 8 - When Notification of Acceptance of the Secondary
Obligor's Offer Is Necessary for Creation of the Secondary
Obligation
Paragraph (1)
Accord: Section 2795 of the California Civil Code
states that "[u]nless notice of acceptance is
expressly required, an offer to become a surety
may be accepted by acting upon it, or by ac-
ceptance upon other consideration." Cal. Civ.
Code § 2795 (West 1993).
Section 2795 also permits an absolute surety-
ship obligation to become binding without no-
tice of acceptance to the secondary obligor.
See id. An absolute obligation unconditionally
promises to be responsible for the principal
obligation in the event of the default of the
principal obligor. See, e.g., Davenport v.
Stratton, 24 Cal. 2d 232, 236, 243, 149 P.2d 4,
6, 9 (1944) (stating that "guaranty was abso-
lute in form!' when guaranty agreement prom-
ised that secondary obligors "will well and
truly pay the said rent or any arrears thereof'
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Paragraph (2)
Contra:
in the event of default by the principal obli-
gor); Thorpe v. Story, 10 Cal. 2d 104, 107-08,
118, 73 P.2d 1194, 1202 (1937) (noting that
guaranty which stated that secondary obligors
"do hereby unconditionally guaranty" was "an
absolute or unconditional guaranty," which "is
binding upon the guarantor without notice of
acceptance").
Section 2795 of the California Civil Code
draws no distinction between cases in which
the secondary obligor has adequate means of
learning of the obligee's acceptance and those
in which the secondary obligor does not. See
Cal. Civ. Code § 2795 (West 1993).
Section 9- Consideration
Paragraph (1)
Accord: Section 2792 of the California Civil Code
states that "a consideration distinct from that
of the original obligation" must exist in all
cases, except those in which the "suretyship
obligation is entered into at the same time with
the original obligation, or with the acceptance
of the latter by the creditor, and forms with
that obligation a part of the consideration to
him . . . ." Cal. Civ. Code § 2792 (West
1993). These exceptions to the consideration
requirement appear to fall generally within the
exception in section 9, paragraph (2)(a) of the
Restatement of Suretyship. However, as noted
below, the exceptions in paragraphs (2)(b) and
(c), and possibly (d), do not appear to be rec-
ognized under California law. For an example
of a suretyship arrangement held invalid for
lack of consideration, see Rusk v. Johnston, 18
Cal. App. 2d 408, 409, 63 P.2d 1167, 1169
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(1937) (declining to find consideration for
guaranty in light of "substantial evidence that
the guaranty was not requested nor given until
after the [underlying obligation] was executed
and the consideration for [the underlying obli-
gation] passed").
Paragraph (2) (a)
Accord: Section 2792 of the California Civil Code
permits a suretyship obligation to exist in the
absence of additional consideration "with the
acceptance of the [original obligation] by the
creditor, provided that the suretyship obliga-
tion forms with that [original] obligation a part
of the consideration" to the creditor (obligee).
Cal. Civ. Code § 2792 (West 1993). This is
true under section 2792 even if the suretyship
agreement is not entered into at the same time
as the original obligation. See id. at n.2.
California case law is also generally in accord
with paragraph (2)(a). In Stroud v. Thomas,
139 Cal. 274, 275, 72 P. 1008, 1008 (1903),
the court held that a suretyship obligation was
binding even though it was executed by the
secondary obligor without additional consid-
eration after the underlying note had been exe-
cuted by the principal obligors. Because the
suretyship obligation had been part of the bar-
gained-for exchange between the obligee and
the principal obligors, the subsequent execu-
tion by the secondary obligor, "being in pursu-
ance of the original agreement, relate[d] back
to and [took] effect the same as if it had been
coincident with the execution by the principal
debtors." Id.; cf. Rusk v. Johnston, 18 Cal.
App. 2d 408, 409, 63 P.2d 1167, 1167 (1937)
(declining to find consideration for guaranty in
light of "substantial evidence that the guaranty
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was not requested nor given until after the
[underlying obligation] was executed and the
consideration for [the underlying obligation]
passed").
In addition, one California court appears to
have gone slightly beyond the position in
paragraph (2)(a), finding consideration for a
guaranty for a bundle of loans, even though
the first loan was made before the guaranty
was considered. In Beverly Hills National
Bank v. Glynn, 267 Cal. App. 2d 859, 862-63,
73 Cal. Rptr. 808, 810 (1968), a secondary
obligor executed one guaranty on February 14,
1963, that eventually was alleged to guaranty
three loans. The first loan was made on Feb-
ruary 1, the second on February 13, and the
third on April 22. Even though the note for
the February 1 loan "had been executed and
accepted prior to the time the guaranty was
considered," the court found merit in the con-
tention "that the successive events were part of
a single transaction and that, for this reason,
the guaranty is supported by consideration."
Id. at 868, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 813. The court
stated that "the granting of the February 13th
and April 22nd loans on the faith of that guar-
anty was all the consideration required to
make effective the included guaranty of the
February 1st note." Id., 73 Cal. Rptr. at 814;
see also Roscoe Steffen & Richard S.E. Johns,
The After-Acquired Surety: Commercial Pa-
per, 59 Cal. L. Rev. 1459 (1971).
Paragraph (2)(b)
Contra: Section 2792 of the California Civil Code
states that a suretyship obligation must be
supported by consideration distinct fiom that
of the original obligation "in all other cases,"
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except those covered under paragraph (2)(a)
and those in which the suretyship and princi-
pal obligations are executed concurrently.
Cal. Civ. Code § 2792 (West 1993). Neither
the California Civil Code nor the case law rec-
ognizes an exception for written suretyship
agreements that recite nominal consideration.
Although section 1614 of the California Civil
Code establishes that a written contract is pre-
sumptive evidence of consideration, this pre-
sumption is rebuttable. See Cal. Civ. Code §
1614 (West 1982); see also Kott i. Hilton, 45
Cal. App. 2d 548, 552-54, 114 P.2d 666, 668
(1941) (upholding trial court's finding that
written agreement was not supported by con-
sideration). Furthermore, courts have inter-
preted the presumption raised by section 1614
as placing only a burden of producing evi-
dence-as opposed to a burden of proof-on
the party seeking to claim want of considera-
tion. See, e.g., Rancho Santa Fe Phannacy;
Inc. v. Seyfert, 219 Cal. App. 3d 875, 884, 268
Cal. Rptr. 505, 510 (1990).
The consideration need not run to the secon-
dary obligor, however, since a significant new
benefit to the primary obligor will suffice. See
Cal. Bank v. Kenoyer, 2 Cal. App. 2d 367,
369, 37 P.2d 836, 837 (1934); Irving . Intin,
133 Cal. App. 374, 378, 24 P.2d 215, 216-17
(1933); Kinney v. Jos. Herspring & Co., 53
Cal. App. 628, 638, 200 P. 737, 741 (1921).
Paragraph (2)(c)
Other: The comment to paragraph (2)(c) indicates
that this paragraph refers to statutes under
which a seal or a statutory substitute for a seal
creates a binding suretyship obligation, re-
gardless of the existence or nonexistence of
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separate consideration. See Restatement
(Third) of Suretyship § 9 cmt. (2)(c) (1995).
Section 1629 of the California Civil Code
abolishes the distinction between sealed and
unsealed contracts. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1629
(West 1985). Therefore, paragraph (2)(c) is ir-
relevant in California.
Accord: Part 2, title 14, chapter 2 of the California
Code of Civil Procedure does appear to estab-
lish a statutory scheme for creating a certain
class of suretyship obligation regardless of the
presence or absence of consideration. See Cal.
Civ. Proc. Code § 995.320 (West Supp. 1999).
This portion of the code applies to bonds and
undertakings, including surety bonds, executed
pursuant to state statutes. Section 995.320 of
the California Code of Civil Procedure estab-
lishes the requirements for the contents of the
bond and the liability of the secondary obli-
gors. See id. No requirement of consideration
appears in this section, and section 995.320(b)
states that "[tihe sureties signing the bond are
jointly and severally liable on the obligations
of the bond." Id. § 995.320(b).
Paragraph (2)(d)
Other: Although California courts have long recog-
nized the principle that a promisee's reason-
able reliance on a promise may sometimes
bind the promisor, even if the promise is un-
supported by consideration, see, e.g., Drennan
v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 413, 333
P.2d 757, 759 (1958), they have never explic-
itly employed this approach in a suretyship or
guaranty case. The plain language of section
2792 of the California Civil Code requires
consideration "in all other cases," except those
in which "[the] suretyship obligation is entered
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into at the same time with the original obliga-
tion, or with the acceptance of the latter by the
creditor, and forms with that obligation a part
of the consideration to him. . . ." Cal. Civ.
Code § 2792 (West 1993). The ability to rely
on the guaranty, however, may be the exact
consideration for which the obligee bargained.
In California Bank v. Kenoyer, 2 Cal. App. 2d
367, 369, 37 P.2d 836, 837 (1934), the creditor
agreed to forbear in enforcing a judgment in
return for a guaranty; the court found the det-
riment suffered by the creditor on delaying
proceedings for the enforcement of the judg-
ment to constitute consideration for the guar-
anty. The comment to Restatement of Sure,-
ship section 9 recognizes this, stating that
reliance by an obligee "often can be found to
have been bargained for." Restatement
(Third) of Suretyship § 9 cmt. (2)(d) (1995).
See annotation to paragraph 2(b).
Section 10 - Capacity
Paragraph (1)
Accord:
Paragraph (2)
Accord:
The secondary obligation is contractual and is
governed by section 1556 of the California
Civil Code, which provides that "[a]ll persons
are capable of contracting, except minors, per-
sons of unsound mind, and persons deprived
of civil rights." Cal. Civ. Code § 1556 (West
1982).
Legal persons, such as corporations, are in
general given the same rights as natural per-
sons, including the right to enter into con-
tracts. See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 207 (West
1999). The secondary obligation is contrac-
tual and is governed by section 1556 of the
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Paragraph (3)
California Civil Code, which provides that
"[a]ll persons are capable of contracting, ex-
cept minors, persons of unsound mind, and
persons deprived of civil rights." Cal. Civ.
Code § 1556 (West 1982).
No relevant California authority.
Section 11 - Statute of Frauds
Paragraph (1)
Accord: Section 2793 of the California Civil Code pro-
vides that a contract creating a secondary obli-
gation must be in writing and signed by the
secondary obligor unless an exception applies.
See Cal. Civ. Code § 2793 (West 1993).
Section 1624(a)(2) of the California Civil
Code provides that a contract to answer for the
debt of another must be in writing and "sub-
scribed by the party to be charged or by the
party's agent." Cal. Civ. Code § 1624(a)(2)
(West Supp. 1999).
Paragraph (2)(a)
No relevant California authority.
Paragraph (2)(b)
No relevant California authority.
Paragraph (2)(c)
Other: Whether the promise to pay for the debt of an-
other is original or collateral depends largely
on the determination of whether the direct ob-
ject of the promise is to become liable on the
default of the principal obligor or, in the alter-
native, the object of the promise is to subserve
some purpose of the secondary obligor (al-
though the effect is to pay the debtor's obliga-
tion). See Ackley v. Prime, 99 Cal. App. 534,
539-40, 278 P. 932, 934 (1929).
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Paragraph (3) (a)
Other Under California law, where the promise cre-
ating a secondary obligation is upon consid-
eration beneficial to the secondary obligor, it
need not be in writing, whether the considera-
tion moves from either party to the original
obligation or from another. See Cal. Civ.
Code § 2794(4) (West 1993).
Paragraph (3)(b)(i)
Accord: Section 2794(1) of the California Civil Code
provides that a promise to answer for the obli-
gation of another is an original obligation. It
is not a secondary obligation within the Statute
of Frauds where the promise is made by one
who has received property of another upon an
undertaking to apply it pursuant to such
promise. See Cal Civ. Code § 2794(1) (,Vest
1993).
Paragraphs (3)(b)(ii) and (b)(iii)
No relevant California authority.
Paragraph (3)(c)
Accord:
Paragraph (3)(d)
Contra:
Section 2794(4) of the California Civil Code
provides that a contract to answer for the debt
of another is not within the Statute of Frauds
where the promise is upon consideration bene-
ficial to the promisor. See Cal. Civ. Code §
2794(4) (West 1993); Farr & Stone Ins. Bro-
kers, Inc. v. Lopez, 61 Cal. App. 3d 618, 621,
132 Cal. Rptr. 641, 642 (1976); see also Cal.
Civ. Code § 2794(1) (finding a contract to an-
swer for the debt of another is not within the
Statute of Frauds where the promisor receives
a "discharge from an obligation in whole or in
part, in consideration of such promise").
A promise by a payor under a promissory note
to secondary obligors to partially indemnify
them as secondary obligors is within the Stat-
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ute of Frauds. See McClendon v. Heisinger,
42 Cal. App. 780, 783, 184 P. 52, 53 (1919).
Paragraph (3)(e)
Other: Section 2794(2) of the California Civil Code
provides that the contract of the secondary ob-
ligor is not within the Statue of Frauds where
the secondary obligor receives consideration
under circumstances that render it the principal
obligor. See Cal. Civ. Code § 2794(2) (West
1993).
Paragraph (3)()
Accord: Section 2794(6) of the California Civil Code
provides that a holder of an instrument for the
payment of money who transfers it and enters
into a promise respecting such instrument is
deemed to have made an original obligation
that is not within the Statute of Frauds. See
Cal. Civ. Code § 2794(6) (West 1993).
Paragraph (3)(g)
Accord: Section 2794(5) of the California Civil Code
provides that a factor selling merchandise for a
commission and acting as a secondary obligor
in connection with the sale is deemed to have
made an original obligation that is not within
the Statute of Frauds. See Cal. Civ. Code §
2794(5) (West 1993).
Paragraph (3)(h)
Accord: Under California law, "there is not a contract
to answer for the debt of another within the
statute of frauds where the alleged guarantor
promises the debtor, rather than the creditor to
pay the ... debt." King v. Smith, 33 Cal. 2d
71, 74, 199 P.2d 308, 310 (1948) (emphasis in
original).
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Section 12 - When Secondary Obligation Is Voidable Due to
Misrepresentation
Paragraph (1)
Accord:
Paragraph (2)
Accord:
Paragraph (3)
Accord:
Under California law, "the [obligee] owes to
the surety a duty of continuous good faith and
fair dealing." Sumitomo Bank v. liwasaki, 70
CaL 2d 81, 85, 447 P.2d 956, 959, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 564, 567 (1968). An obligee's fraud,
"which may consist of intentional or negligent
misrepresentation or active suppression of the
truth," will void the secondary obligation as to
any subsequently incurred liability. Id.
Under California law, fraud of the principal
obligor will not relieve a secondary obligor
who acted at the request of the principal obli-
gor, if the obligee did not have notice of the
fraud and did not participate in it. See Pierce
v. Wright, 117 Cal. App. 2d 718, 724, 256
P.2d 1049, 1052 (1953).
Under California law, an obligee has a duty to
disclose to the secondary obligor facts that the
obligee has reason to believe materially in-
crease the secondary obligor's risk beyond that
which the obligee has reason to believe the
secondary obligor intends to assume, which
facts the obligee believes are unknown to the
secondary obligor, and which facts the obligee
has reasonable opportunity to communicate to
the secondary obligor. See Sumitomo Bank v.
Iwasak, 70 Cal. 2d 81, 84, 447 P.2d 956, 958-
64, 73 Cal. Rptr. 564, 566-72 (1968). Where
the secondary obligor assents to the secondary
obligation at the request of the principal obli-
gor, rather than the obligee, the obligee may
assume that the secondary obligor will acquire
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Paragraph (4)
Accord:
Paragraph (5)
Paragraph (6)
Accord:
from the principal obligor all such informa-
tion. See id. at 88-93, 447 P.2d at 961-64, 73
Cal. Rptr. at 569-72.
See Sumitomo Bank v. Iwasaki, 70 Cal. 2d 81,
88-93, 447 P.2d 956, 961-64, 73 Cal. Rptr.
564, 569-72 (1968), discussed in paragraph (3)
above.
No relevant California authority.
See Sumitomo Bank v. Iwasaki, 70 Cal. 2d 81,
88-93, 447 P.2d 956, 961-64, 73 Cal. Rptr.
564, 569-72 (1968), discussed in paragraph (3)
above.
Section 13 -Assignment of Obligee's Rights
Paragraph (1)(a)
No relevant California authority.
Paragraph (1)(b)
Accord: Under California law, an assignment is inef-
fective if forbidden by statute or otherwise by
public policy. See Pac. Elec. Ry. Co. v. Com-
monwealth Bonding & Cas. Ins. Co., 55 Cal.
App. 704, 707-08, 204 P. 262, 263 (1921).
Paragraph (1)(c)
Accord: A contractual prohibition against assignment
is effective as long as it does not violate
statutory provisions. See Masterson v. Sine,
68 Cal. 2d 222, 230, 436 P.2d 561, 566, 65
Cal. Rptr. 545, 550 (1968); Kracht v. Perrin,
Gartland & Doyle, 219 Cal. App. 3d 1019,
1023-24, 268 Cal. Rptr. 637, 639-41 (1990);
Jackson v. Rogers & Wells, 210 Cal. App. 3d
336, 342, 258 Cal. Rptr. 454, 457 (1989);
Goodley v. Wank & Wank Inc., 62 Cal. App.
3d 389, 395, 133 Cal. Rptr. 83, 86 (1976);
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Thomas v. Thomas, 192 Cal. App. 2d 771,
779, 13 CaL Rptr. 872, 877 (1961).
Paragraphs (2) and (3)
No relevant California authority.
Paragraph (4)(a)
Accord: California Commercial Code section 9318(4)
provides that "[a] term in any contract be-
tween an account debtor and an assignor is in-
effective if it prohibits assignment of an ac-
count or prohibits creation of a security
interest in chattel paper or a security interest in
a general intangible for money due or to be-
come due . . . ." Cal. Com. Code § 9318(4)
(West 1990).
Revised division 9 embodies provisions simi-
lar to those of paragraph 4(a). See Cal. Com.
Code § 9203(f), (g) (West Supp. 1999) ("[t]he
attachment of a security interest in collateral
... is also attachment of a security interest in
a supporting obligation for the collateral";
when an obligee transfers an obligation that is
secured by a security interest, the security in-
terest transfers along with the obligation); id. §
9308(d), (e) (stating that when obligee perfects
a security interest in collateral, subsection (d)
provides for the perfection of a security inter-
est in the supporting obligation for the collat-
eral and when obligee perfects a security in-
terest in a right to payment or performance,
subsection (e) provides for perfection of a se-
curity interest in a security interest, mortgage,
or other lien on personal or real property
which secures the right); id. § 9406(d)(1), (2)
(providing that term in promissory note or le-
gal restriction which prohibits, restricts, or re-
quires consent for its assignment or provides
that assignment of the security interest will
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give rise to a default or breach is ineffective);
id. § 9407(a) (stating that terms in lease
agreement that prohibit, restrict, or require
consent for the assignment of a security inter-
est in an interest under the lease contract or
which provide that assignment of an interest
may give rise to a default, breach, right of re-
coupment, claim, defense, termination, right of
termination, or remedy under the lease are
generally ineffective).
Paragraph (4)(b)
Accord: Under California law, a cause of action for
breach of contract is generally assignable ab-
sent some special rule forbidding it. See Cal.
Civ. Code § 954 (West Supp. 2000); Goodley
v. Wank & Wank, Inc., 62 Cal. App. 3d 389,
393, 133 Cal. Rptr. 83, 84 (1976). Contractual
language barring the assignment of the con-
tract does not prevent assignment of a cause of
action arising from breach. See Shively v.
Semi-Tropic Land & Water Co., 99 Cal. 259,
261, 33 P. 848, 849 (1893).
Paragraph (5)
Accord: Section 1084 of the California Civil Code pro-
vides that the transfer of a thing transfers the
incidents. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1084 (West
1982). Under California law, whatever oper-
ates as an assignment of the debt will operate
as an assignment of the secondary obligation.
See Thorpe v. Story, 10 Cal. 2d 104, 119, 73
P.2d 1194, 1205 (1937); Champion Home
Builders Co. v. Sipes, 219 Cal. App. 3d 1415,
1423, 269 Cal. Rptr. 75, 79 (1990).
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Section 14
Generally
Accord:
- Interpretation of the Secondary Obligation-
Section 2837 of the California Civil Code pro-
vides that in interpreting the terms of a con-
tract of suretyship, the same rules are to be ob-
served as in the case of other contracts. See
Cal. Civ. Code § 2837 (,Vest 1993); see also,
e.g., United States Leasing Corp. v. DuPont,
69 Cal. 2d 275, 284, 444 P.2d 65, 71, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 393, 399 (1968); Bloom v. Bender, 48
Cal. 2d 793, 803, 313 P.2d 568, 574 (1957);
White v. Indem. Ins. Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d
160, 162, 54 Cal. Rptr. 630, 632 (1966); Stan-
dard Oil Co. v. Houser, 101 Cal. App. 2d 480,
487, 225 P.2d 539, 543 (1950).
Section 15- Use of Particular Terms
Paragraph (a)
Other.
Paragraph (b)
Accord:
Section 2787 of the California Civil Code pro-
vides that the distinction between sureties and
guarantors is abolished. A surety or guarantor
is one who promises to answer for the debt,
default, or miscarriage of another, or hypothe-
cates property as security therefor. See Cal.
Civ. Code § 2787 (West Supp. 2000). See
also annotation to section 15(c).
Section 2800 of the California Civil Code pro-
vides that "[a] guaranty to the effect that an
obligation is good, or is collectible, imports
that the [principal obligor] is solvent, and that
the demand is collectible by the usual legal
proceedings, if taken with reasonable dili-
gence." CaL Civ. Code § 2800 (West 1993).
Section 2801 of the California Civil Code pro-
vides that "[a] guaranty... is not discharged
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Paragraph (c)
Accord:
Paragraph (d)
Contra:
Other:
by an omission to take proceedings upon the
principal debt, or upon any collateral security
for its payment, if no part of the debt could
have been collected thereby." Id. § 2801.
Section 2802 of the California Civil Code pro-
vides that "the removal of the [principal obli-
gor] from the state, leaving no property therein
from which the obligation might be satisfied,
is equivalent to the insolvency of the [princi-
pal obligor] in its effect upon the rights and
obligations of the guarantor." Id. § 2802. The
complaint in an action involving a guaranty of
collection must allege that (1) the claims are
not good or collectible, (2) the claims have
been reduced to judgment and execution
thereon returned unsatisfied, (3) the principal
obligors are insolvent, or (4) for some reason
legal proceedings would be unavailing. See
Menefee v. Robert A. Klein & Co., 121 Cal.
App. 294, 295-97, 9 P.2d 219, 219-20 (1932).
As between co-obligors on the same contract
or instrument, the word "surety" written oppo-
site the name of one of the obligors or the sig-
nature is accompanied by words indicating
that the co-obligor is acting as a secondary
obligor. See Cal. Corn. Code § 3419(c) (West
Supp. 2000); Aud v. Magruder, 10 Cal. 282,
291 (1858).
In Wexler v. McLucas, 48 Cal. App. 3d 9, 12-
14, 121 Cal. Rptr. 453, 455-56 (1975), the
court declined to acknowledge any secondary
meaning or legal significance to the term "co-
signer."
Section 2832 of the California Civil Code pro-
vides that "one who appears to be a principal,
268
CALIFORNIA COMMENTARY
whether by the terms of a written instrument
or otherwise, may show that he is in fact a
surety, except as against persons who have
acted on the faith of his apparent character of
principal." Cal. Civ. Code § 2832 (Vest
1993). In an action brought against a husband
and wife as principals, evidence sustained a
finding that the wife signed as comaker, not-
withstanding evidence offered by the wife as
permitted by this section, tending to show that
she was a secondary obligor. See First Nat '
Bank v. Williams, 54 Cal. App. 537, 538-39,
202 P. 164, 164-65 (1921); see also Cal. Com.
Code § 3419 (West Supp. 2000) and related
commentary.
Paragraph (e)
See annotations to section 16.
Section 16- Continuing Guaranty
Accord: Section 2814 of the California Civil Code pro-
vides that "[a] guaranty relating to a future li-
ability of the principal [obligor], under succes-
sive transactions, which either continues his
liability or from time to time renews it after it
has been satisfied, is called a continuing guar-
anty." Cal. Civ. Code § 2814 (,Vest 1993).
Section 2815 of the California Civil Code pro-
vides that "[a] continuing guaranty may be re-
voked at any time by the guarantor, in respect
to future transactions, unless there is a con-
tinuing consideration as to such transactions
which the surety does not renounce." Id. §
2815. The death of an individual secondary
obligor, with the creditor's knowledge thereof,
will revoke a continuing guaranty with respect
to future advances, unless the parties have oth-
erwise agreed by explicit language. See Am.
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City Bank v. Tourtelot, 86 Cal. App. 3d 585,
590, 150 Cal. Rptr. 361, 364 (1978).
Section 17 - Effect of Suretyship Status on Rights and Duties
of the Secondary Obligor and Generally
Paragraph (1)
Accord:
Paragraph (2)
Accord:
In California, the rights of the secondary obli-
gor against the principal obligor are (1) those
existing as a result of any contract between
them and (2) the rights that arise out of surety-
ship, which are set forth in the California Civil
Code. See Cal. Civ. Code § 2848 (West
1993). See also annotations to section 18.
A secondary obligor cannot be held beyond
the terms or legal effect of the secondary obli-
gor's engagement. See Calluin v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 186 Cal. App. 2d 885,
887, 337 P.2d 259, 261 (1959). See also an-
notations to sections 19 and 32 through 49
below.
Section 18 - Suretyship Status and Recourse of Secondary Ob-
ligor Against Principal Obligor
Paragraph (1)
Accord Section 2846 of the California Civil Code pro-
vides that a secondary obligor may compel the
principal obligor to perform the obligation
when due. See Cal. Civ. Code § 2846 (West
1993). Additionally, section 2847 of the Cali-
fornia Civil Code provides that if the secon-
dary obligor satisfies the principal obligation
in whole or in part, with or without legal pro-
ceedings, the principal is bound to reimburse
what he has disbursed, including necessary
costs and expenses. See id. § 2847.
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Paragraph (2)(a)
Accord: Section 2846 of the California Civil Code pro-
vides that a secondary obligor may compel the
principal obligor to perform the obligation
when due. See Cal. Civ. Code § 2846 (West
1993). After the obligation becomes payable,
the secondary obligor may, before paying the
obligation and irrespective of whether the sec-
ondary obligor has been sued, maintain an ac-
tion against the obligor to compel the obligor
to pay the debt or perform the obligation. See
Josephian v. Lion, 66 Cal. App. 650, 227 P.
204 (1924). For further discussion, see anno-
tation to section 21.
Paragraph (2)(b)
Accord: Section 2847 of the California Civil Code pro-
vides that where the secondary obligor satis-
fies the principal obligation in whole or in
part, with or without legal proceedings, the
secondary obligor is entitled to reimbursement
from the principal obligor. See Cal. Civ. Code
§ 2847 (West 1993). For further discussion,
see annotations to sections 22 through 24.
Paragraph (2)(c)
See annotation to section 26.
Paragraph (2)(d)
Accord: Section 2848 of the California Civil Code pro-
vides that a secondary obligor, upon satisfying
the obligation of the principal obligor, is enti-
tled to enforce every remedy that the creditor
then has against the principal obligor to the
extent of reimbursing what the secondary ob-
ligor has expended. See Cal. Civ. Code §
2848 (West 1993). Further, section 2849 of
the California Civil Code provides that a see-
ondary obligor is entitled to the benefit of
every security for the performance of the prin-
cipal obligation held by the creditor. See id.
November 2000]
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Paragraph (a)
Accord:
Paragraph (b)
Accord:
Section 2839 of the California Civil Code pro-
vides that performance of the principal obliga-
tion exonerates a secondary obligor. See Cal.
Civ. Code § 2839 (West 1993).
Section 2810 of the California Civil Code pro-
vides that a secondary obligor is liable not-
withstanding mere personal disability of the
principal obligor, though the disability be such
as to make the contract void against the prin-
cipal obligor. See Cal. Civ. Code § 2810
(West 1993). However, the secondary obligor
is not liable if for any other reason there is no
liability upon the part of the principal obligor
at the time of the execution of the contract, or
the liability of the principal obligor thereafter
ceases, unless the secondary obligor has as-
sumed liability with knowledge of the exis-
tence of the defense. See id. Section 2825 of
the California Civil Code provides that a sec-
ondary obligor is not exonerated by the dis-
charge of the principal obligor by operation of
law, without the intervention or omission of
the obligee. See id. § 2825. For further dis-
cussion, see annotation to section 34.
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§ 2849. Unlike reimbursement, the right of
subrogation is available to a secondary obligor
only upon total satisfaction of the underlying
debt by such secondary obligor. There is, for
significant policy reasons, no such thing as
partial subrogation. See annotations to sec-
tions 27 through 29.
Section 19 - Suretyship Status-Defenses of Secondary Obli-
gor Against Obligee
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Paragraph (c)
See annotations to sections 37-45.
Paragraph (d)
Accord: Section 2839 of the California Civil Code pro-
vides that an offer of performance duly made
as provided therein exonerates a secondary
obligor. See Cal. Civ. Code § 2839 (,West
1993).
Section 20 - When Principal Obligor Is Charged With Notice
of Secondary Obligation
Other: California Civil Code section 2788 and the
Restatement of Suretyship take a similar ap-
proach, and only differ in that the Restate-
inent's requirements to impute knowledge to
the principal obligor are more specific. Sec-
tion 2788 of the California Civil Code pro-
vides that a person may become a secondary
obligor without the knowledge or consent of
the principal obligor. See Cal. Civ. Code §
2788 (West 1993). Under California law, the
duties of the principal obligor and the corre-
sponding rights of the secondary obligor are
the same regardless of whether the principal
obligor has notice of the secondary obligation.
For example, section 2846 of the California
Civil Code states that a secondary obligor may
compel the principal obligor to perform the
obligation when due, but does not differentiate
between situations in which the principal obli-
gor is charged with notice of the secondary
obligation and those in which the principal
obligor is not. See id. § 2846.
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Section 21 - Principal Obligor's Duty of Performance; Exon-
eration
Paragraphs (1)
Accord:
Paragraph (3)
Other:
Note:
and (2)
Section 2846 of the California Civil Code
states that a secondary obligor may compel the
principal obligor to perform the obligation
when due. See Cal. Civ. Code § 2846 (West
1993). An action may be brought by the sec-
ondary obligor to compel the principal obligor
to satisfy the underlying obligation even
though the secondary obligor has not per-
formed its obligation. See Cal. Civ. Proc.
Code § 1050 (West 1980) (providing that an
action by a secondary obligor for the purpose
of compelling principal obligor to satisfy a
debt due to another); Escrow Agents' Fid.
Corp. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. App. 4th 491,
495, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 698, 701 (1992); Karn v.
Wills, 50 Cal. App. 2d 604, 606-09, 123 P.2d
640, 641-43 (1942). Furthermore, the theory
of quia timet (action for relief against antici-
pated injury) allows a secondary obligor to
prevent dissipation of funds that could be used
to satisfy the principal obligation. See Escrow
Agents', 4 Cal. App. 4th at 496, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 701.
Section 2846 of the California Civil Code does
not differentiate between situations in which
the principal obligor is charged with notice of
the secondary obligation and those in which
the principal obligor has no knowledge
thereof. See Cal. Civ. Code § 2846 (West
1993).
In Escrow Agents' Fidelity, there is a perfect
illustration of the observation expressed in the
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Reporter's Note to section 21U) of the Re-
statement of Suretship-that courts often
confuse the "equity of exoneration" (i.e., a
secondary obligor's right to compel the princi-
pal to perform the underlying obligation) and
quia tinet. Although couched in terms of quia
timnet, Escrow Agents' Fidelity expresses "eq-
uity of exoneration" language while relying
upon a Tenth Circuit case cited in the Re-
statement of Suret.,ship as a classic example of
the judicial confusion of the two doctrines.
See Escrow Agents' Fid. Corp. v Superior
Court, 4 Cal. App. 4th 491, 495, 5 Cal. Rptr.
2d 698, 701 (1992).
Section 22 - Duty of Principal Obligor to Reimburse Secon-
dary Obligor
Accord: Section 2849 of the California Civil Code
gives the secondary obligor a right to reim-
bursement by the principal obligor whether or
not the principal obligor is charged with notice
of the secondary obligation. See Cal. Civ.
Code § 2849 (West 1993); see also Golden
Eagle Ins. Co. v. First Nationwide Fin. Cinp.,
26 Cal. App. 4th 160, 167-68, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d
815, 820 (1994). See also the annotation to
section 26.
See annotation to section 20.
Section 23 - Measure of the Reimbursement to Which the
Secondary Obligor Is Entitled
Paragraph (1)
Accord: California Civil Code section 2847 permits the
secondary obligor to recover reimbursement
for necessary costs and expenses. See Cal.
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Civ. Code § 2847 (West 1999); Louisville Title
Ins. Co. v. Sur. Title & Guar. Co., 60 Cal.
App. 3d 781, 132 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1976).
Section 24 - When the Duty to Reimburse Does Not Arise
Paragraph (1)(c)
Accord: In Heckes v. Sapp, 229 Cal. App. 2d 549,
554-55, 40 Cal. Rptr. 485, 488-89 (1964), the
court (in dictum) stated that a secondary obli-
gor would not have a right of reimbursement
against a principal protected by California
Code of Civil Procedure section 580b, which
prohibits deficiency judgments against certain
purchase money obligors. The secondary ob-
ligors argued that they were protected by sec-
tion 580b because their statutory right of re-
imbursement against the principal obligor
would indirectly expose the obligor to defi-
ciency liability. See id. at 551, 40 Cal. Rptr. at
487. The court reasoned that there would be
no such right of reimbursement precisely be-
cause that would indirectly avoid the antidefi-
ciency legislation. See id. at 553, 40 Cal. Rptr.
at 488.
Section 25 - Collateral for Principal Obligor's Duty to
Reimburse Also Secures Principal Obligor's Duty to Perform
Other: Section 2854 of the California Civil Code pro-
vides that "[a] creditor is entitled to the benefit
of everything which a surety has received
from the debtor by way of security for the per-
formance of the obligation, and may, upon the
maturity of the obligation, compel the appli-
cation of such security to its satisfaction."
Cal. Civ. Code § 2854 (West 1999).
CALIFORNIA COMM1ENTARY
Section 26- Restitution
See annotation to section 22.
Section 27- When Secondary Obligor Has a Right of
Subrogation
General: Section 2848 of the California Civil Code pro-
vides that a secondary obligor, upon satisfying
the obligation of the principal, is entitled to
enforce every remedy that the creditor then
has against the principal to the extent of reim-
bursing the amount the secondary obligor has
expended. See Cal. Civ. Code § 2848 (Vest
1993). There are, however, two conflicting
lines of case authority in California with re-
spect to a secondary obligor's subrogation to
the rights of the creditor against the principal
obligor. One example of a case that expounds
the position contrary to the Restatement of
Suretyship is Regents of the University of
California v. Harford Accident & Indemnity
Co. The Supreme Court of California fol-
lowed the older view that a secondary obligor
who pays the principal debt extinguishes that
obligation and thus cannot sue the debtor as
the subrogee of the original debt. See Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Harfford Accident & In-
dem. Co., 21 Cal. 3d 624, 637, 581 P.2d 197,
204, 147 Cal. Rptr. 486, 493 (1978). More re-
cent cases have held that a secondary obligor
who has paid the principal obligation is subro-
gated to all of the creditor's collection rights
against the debtor. See, e.g., Flojo Int'l, Inc. v.
Lassleben, 4 Cal. App. 4th 713, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d
99 (1992). In Flojo, a secondary obligor who
satisfied a guaranteed note brought suit against
the maker for amounts paid on the note by the
secondary obligor to the obligee, default inter-
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est, costs, and attorney fees incurred in its
collection, all in accordance with the terms of
the note. See id. at 716, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 100.
The court cited section 3415(5) of the Califor-
nia Commercial Code, which provided that
"an accommodation party is not liable to the
party accommodated, and if he pays the in-
strument has a right of recourse on the instru-
ment against such party." Id. at 722, 6 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 103-04 (quoting Cal. Com. Code §
3415(5) (West 1964), repealed by Cal. Com.
Code § 3419 (West Supp. 2000)). Therefore,
plaintiff was entitled to enforce the note
against the principal in accordance with its
terms, including an increased default interest
rate and an award of attorneys fees. See id. at
723, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 104. When a secondary
obligor satisfies the obligations of the princi-
pal, the secondary obligor is subrogated to the
rights of the creditor and "'is entitled to en-
force every remedy which the creditor then
has against the principal."' Id. at 722, 6 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 104 (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 2848
(West 1993)).
Section 28 - Rights Obtained Through Subrogation
Paragraphs (1)(a) and (1)(c)
Accord: See Cal. Civ. Code § 2848 (West 1993); see
also Golden Eagle Ins. Co. v. First Nationwide
Fin. Corp., 26 Cal. App. 4th 160, 31 Cal. Rptr.
2d 815 (1994) (holding that a secondary obli-
gor who satisfied a contractor's obligations to
a subcontractor in full was entitled to enforce
mechanics' liens rights previously held by the
obligee subcontractor).
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Paragraph (1)(b)
Accord: Section 2848 of the California Civil Code pro-
vides, inter alia, that a secondary obligor is
entitled to seek contribution from cosureties
upon satisfying the principals' obligation of
the principal, but is silent on the issue of sub-
rogation as to a secondary obligor. See Cal.
Civ. Code § 2848 (West 1993). However,
California case law has permitted subrogation
in this instance. See, e.g., Pond v. Dougherty,
6 Cal. App. 686, 688-89, 92 P. 1035, 1036
(1907) (finding that "[a] surety who is com-
pelled to pay the debt of his principal is enti-
tled to be subrogated to all the rights and
remedies of the creditor as against his cosure-
ties in precisely the same manner as against
the principal debtor").
Paragraph (1)(d)
Accord: "The surety may be subrogated to any causes
of action either the creditor or the debtor has
against third parties responsible for the loss."
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. it Harfford Acci-
dent & Indem. Co., 21 Cal. 3d 624, 638 n.6,
581 P.2d 197, 204 n.6, 147 Cal. Rptr. 486, 493
n.6 (1978).
Paragraph (2)
Accord: See Williams v. Riehl, 127 Cal. 365, 372, 59 P.
762, 765 (1899), which held that secondary
obligor assignees to the rights of obligee were
entitled to recover from cosureties the amount
the cosureties were liable for in "the propor-
tion of the respective amounts or penalties for
which they became surety."
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Section 29 -
Obligee
Accord:
Secondary Obligor Succeeds to Priority Status of
The secondary obligor's right to subrogation
goes back to the date of the contract of surety-
ship and takes priority over any assignment
made subsequent to such contract but prior to
payment of the principal obligation. See
County of San Diego v. Croghan, 2 Cal. App.
2d 494, 500, 38 P.2d 474, 477 (1934); see also
In re Charles Nelson Co., 29 F. Supp. 56
(N.D. Cal. 1939) (stating that under California
law, a secondary obligor who pays the princi-
pal's debt is subrogated to all the creditor's
rights and priorities). See annotations to sec-
tion 27 above.
Section 30 - Secondary Obligor Succeeds to Obligee's Free-
dom from Defenses
No relevant California authority.
Section 31 - Secondary Obligor's Right to Return Perform-
ance; Obligee's Right of Setoff
No relevant California authority.
Section 32 - Effect of Suretyship Status on Duties of Secon-
dary Obligor and Obligee; Undisclosed Suretyship Status and
Change in Relationship of Parties
Paragraph (1)
Accord: Section 2837 of the California Civil Code
states that "[i]n interpreting the terms of a
contract of suretyship, the same rules are to be
observed as in the case of other contracts."
See Cal. Civ. Code § 2837 (West 1993); RCA
Corp. v. Hunt, 133 Cal. App. 3d 903, 906, 184
280
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Cal. Rptr. 633, 634 (1982); see also Kal-
fountzos v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 37 Cal.
App. 4th 1655, 1658, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 714,
715-16 (1995) (holding that the defenses of
the principal are available to the secondary
obligor); Airlines Reporting Corp. v. United
States Fid. & Guar. Co., 31 Cal. App. 4th
1458, 1461, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563, 565 (1995)
(holding that the suretyship contract is to be
construed as any other type of contract, giving
effect to the intent and purpose of the parties
to such contract). For further discussion, see
annotations to sections 37 through 49.
Paragraphs (2) and (3)(a)
Accord: Section 2832 of the California Civil Code pro-
vides:
One who appears to be a principal,
whether by the terms of a written in-
strument or otherwise, may show
that he is in fact a secondary obli-
gor, except as against persons who
have acted on the faith of his appar-
ent character of principal. It is not
necessary for him to show that the
creditor accepted him as secondary
obligor.
Cal. Civ. Code § 2832 (West 1993).
Paragraph (3)(a)
Accord: See Cal. Civ. Code § 2832 (West 1993); see
also id. § 2788 (providing that a person may
become a secondary obligor even without the
consent of the principal); Westinghouse Credit
Corp. v. Wolfer, 10 Cal App. 3d 63, 67-68, 88
Cal. Rptr. 654, 656-57 (1970) (wherein the
creditor's failure to recognize the suretyship
relationship between the debtor and a third
person and such creditor's subsequent exten-
sion of time for payment gave rise to a merito-
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rious defense of the debtor when sued by the
creditor on the obligation).
Paragraph (3)(b)
No relevant California authority.
Section 33 - Secondary Obligor's Collateral Available to
Obligee
Accord: Section 2854 of the California Civil Code pro-
vides that a creditor is entitled to the benefit of
everything a secondary obligor has received
from the debtor by way of security for the per-
formance of the debtor's obligation to the sec-
ondary obligor. See Cal. Civ. Code § 2854
(West 1993).
Section 34 - When Defenses of Principal Obligor May Be
Raised by Secondary Obligor as Defenses to Secondary Obli-
gation
General Comment to Sections 34-49:
Sections 34 through 49 relate to defenses of or exoneration of
the secondary obligor. As set forth in the annotations below, the Re-
statement of Suretyship and California law provide similar reasons
why a secondary obligor may have defenses or may be exonerated.
The Restatement of Suretyship provides that in most instances "fun-
damental" alterations in the risks imposed on a secondary obligor re-
sult in the discharge of the secondary obligor. See Restatement
(Third) of Suretyship § 37 (1996). This is also the case under Cali-
fornia law, although less than "fundamental" alterations in such risks
may also exonerate a secondary obligor under California law. Al-
though the reasons for exoneration under California law and the Re-
statement of Suretyship may be similar, the California Civil Code
provides for full exoneration in many instances, while the Restate-
ment of Suretyship provides that the principal obligor loses its right
to enforce the obligations of the secondary obligor only to the extent
of the loss caused to the secondary obligor by the creditor's action.
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See id. On the other hand, division 3 of the California Commercial
Code (Negotiable Instruments) adopts an approach in several in-
stances that is similar to the more limited exoneration provided in the
Restatement of Suretyship. See CaL Com. Code § 3117 (West Supp.
2000) ("To the extent an obligation is modified, supplemented or
nullified by an agreement under this section, the agreement is a de-
fense to the obligation."); Restatement of Suretyship § 37 annots., 9]
4(a), (b). But see Cal Civ. Code § 2819 (West Supp. 2000) (stating
that when creditor alters the original obligation of the principal or the
rights and remedies of the creditor against the principal, without con-
sent of the secondary obligor, the secondary obligor is exonerated).
See annotations to section 37, paragraphs 1 and 3.
Paragraph (1)
Accord: Generally, in California a secondary obligor
has a right to avail itself of any defense that
would be allowed to the principal. See United
States Leasing Corp. v. DuPont, 69 Cal. 2d
275, 290, 444 P.2d 65, 75, 70 Cal. Rptr. 393,
403 (1968) (stating that if a principal obligor is
not liable on an obligation, neither is the sec-
ondary obligor); Flicklinger v. Swedlow Eng g
Co., 45 Cal. 2d 388, 394, 289 P.2d 214, 218
(1955). But see Regents of the Univ. of CaL v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 21 Cal. 3d
624, 636, 581 P.2d 197, 203, 147 Cal. Rptr.
486, 492 (1978) (holding that the obligation of
secondary obligor remains "notwithstanding
the fact that the statute of limitations has run
on the obligation to the principar').
Paragraph (1)(a)
Accord: See Cal. Civ. Code § 2825 (Xest 1993) (stat-
ing that a secondary obligor is not exonerated
by the discharge of the principal by operation
of law without the intervention or omission of
the creditor); see also Regents of the Univ. of
CaL v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 21
Cal. 3d 624, 643, 581 P.2d 197, 208, 147 Cal.
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Rptr. 486, 497 (1978) (recognizing, in dictum,
the public policy against the bankruptcy of a
principal exonerating a secondary obligor).
Note: California Civil Code sections 3225 and 3226
deprive one class of secondary obligors (i.e.,
issuers of bonds in favor of public entities) of
any defenses that might otherwise excuse per-
formance. See Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3225-3226.
Paragraph (1)(b)
Accord: Section 2810 of the California Civil Code ad-
ditionally provides that "any mere personal
disability of the principal, though the disability
be such as to make the contract void against
the principal," will not relieve the surety of li-
ability. Cal. Civ. Code § 2810 (West 1993);
see also Parrish v. Rosebud Mining & Milling
Co., 7 Cal. Unrep. 117, 121, 71 P. 694, 695
(1903) (holding that "if the supposed principal
obligation be void from any cause other than
that of personal disability of the principal ob-
ligor, the guaranty is also of no validity").
Paragraph (2)
Accord: Section 2810 of the California Civil Code pro-
vides:
Where the principal is not liable be-
cause of mere personal disability,
recovery back by the creditor of any
res which formed all or part of the
consideration for the contract shall
have the effect upon the liability of
the surety which is attributed to the
recovery back of such a res under
the law of sales generally.
Cal. Civ. Code § 2810 (West 1993).
Paragraph (3)
See annotations to sections 37 through 49.
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Section 35- Wien Principal Obligor's Claim Against Obligee
May Be Utilized by Secondary Obligor to Reduce Secondary
Obligation
No relevant California authority.
Section 36 - Right of Secondary Obligor to Set Off Claim
Against Obligee Against Secondary Obligation
Accord: As the comment to this section notes, the rule
is an application of the general rule of setoff.
Under California law, counterclaims are
authorized to be filed as cross-complaints. See
CaL Civ. Proc. Code § 428.80 (Vest 1973).
Also, a defendant has a right to assert a
pre-existing cross-demand for money as a de-
fense. See CaL Civ. Proc. Code § 431.70
(West 1973 & Supp. 2000); see also Kr-uger v.
Wells Fargo Bank, 11 Cal. 3d 352, 357-58,
521 P.2d 441, 443-44, 113 Cal. Rptr. 449,
451-52 (1974) (recognizing the general right
of setoff).
Section 37- Impairnent of Suretyship Status
Paragraph (1)
Accord: Under California law, a secondary obligor
may be discharged if the obligee alters the ob-
ligation of the principal obligor or impairs the
remedies or rights of the obligee against the
principal obligor without the consent of the
secondary obligor. See Cal. Civ. Code § 2819
(West 1993 & Supp. 2000); see also United
States v. Freel, 186 U.S. 309 (1902) (stating
that material alteration of original obligation
without secondary obligor's consent dis-
charged secondary obligor); Roberts v. Sec.
Trust & Sav. Bank, 196 Cal. 557, 238 P. 673
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(1925) (same). The discharge of the secon-
dary obligor is generally not limited to the loss
incurred as a result of such alteration or im-
pairment. See annotations to paragraph (3).
Paragraph (2)
Accord: Fundamental alteration in the risks imposed on
the secondary obligor without the secondary
obligor's consent will exonerate the secondary
obligor under California law. However, such
exoneration may also occur when the obliga-
tion of the principal obligor or the remedies or
rights of the obligee against the principal obli-
gor are altered in any respect, regardless of
whether the alteration in the risks imposed is
fundamental. See Cal. Civ. Code § 2819
(West 1993 & Supp. 2000).
Paragraph (2)(a)
Other: A secondary obligor who has been indemni-
fied by the principal obligor will remain liable
with respect to the obligation of the principal
obligor, notwithstanding the modification of
the obligation or the release of the principal
obligor by the obligee without the consent of
the secondary obligor. See Cal. Civ. Code §
2824 (West 1993). However, a mere agree-
ment to indemnify by the principal obligor is
not sufficient; the secondary obligor must have
received "the indemnified amount, physical
collateral or a lien on property." Texaco Ref
& Mktg., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 895
F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying Cali-
fornia law and quoting with approval an ex-
cerpt of the record of the district court).
Paragraph (2)(b)
Accord: See annotation to section 41 (b)(i).
Paragraph (3)(a)
Contra: Under California law, an agreement by the
obligee to accept from the principal obligor
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less than the balance owed on the obligation
without the consent of the secondary obligor
will not discharge the secondary obligor for
the difference between the principal obligation
and the amount accepted. See Cal. Civ. Code
§ 2822(b) (West 1993 & Supp. 2000). Simi-
larly, the discharge of an obligation of a party
to pay a negotiable instrument does not dis-
charge the obligation of an indorser or ac-
commodation party having the right of re-
course against the discharged party. See Cal.
Com. Code § 3605(b) (West Supp. 2000); see
also id. § 3605 cmt. 3 (noting that allowing a
creditor to settle with the principal debtor is in
the interest of secondary obligors as well as
the creditor).
Paragraph (3)(b)
Accord: Under California law, with respect to secon-
dary obligors generally, an extension of the
time for performance of the obligation of the
principal obligor without the consent of the
secondary obligor constitutes a material al-
teration, which results in the discharge of the
secondary obligor. However, such discharge
is not limited to the loss incurred by the sec-
ondary obligor as a result of such extension.
See Cal. Civ. Code § 2819 (,Vest 1993 &
Supp. 2000); see also Daneri v. Gazzola, 139
Cal. 416, 418, 73 P. 179, 180 (1903) (stating
that extending the time of payment of note,
among other things, exonerates secondary ob-
ligor); State Bd. of Equalization v. Carleton,
223 Cal. App. 3d 1607, 1610, 273 Cal. Rptr.
436, 438 (1990) (stating that an agreement to
extend time can be deemed a material altera-
tion that operates to discharge the secondary
obligor, but holding that the secondary obligor
consented to the alteration).
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An extension of the due date of a negotiable
instrument discharges an indorser or accom-
modation party having a right of recourse
against the party whose obligation was ex-
tended. However, this discharge is applicable
only to the extent that such indorser or ac-
commodation party proves that the extension
caused loss with respect to its right of re-
course. See Cal. Corn. Code § 3605(c) (West
Supp. 2000). See also annotation to section
49.
Paragraph (3)(c)
Accord: A material alteration of the obligation of the
principal obligor without the consent of the
secondary obligor will generally discharge the
secondary obligor irrespective of whether the
alteration was prejudicial to the secondary ob-
ligor. See Cal. Civ. Code § 2819 (West 1993
& Supp. 2000); see also ITTDiversified Credit
Corp. v. Highlands Ins. Co., 191 Cal. App. 3d
301, 306, 236 Cal. Rptr. 433, 436 (1987); Ve-
dugo Highlands, Inc. v. Sec. Ins. Co., 240 Cal.
App. 2d 527, 530, 49 Cal. Rptr. 736, 739
(1966).
A material modification of a negotiable in-
strument completely discharges the obligation
of an indorser or accommodation party, except
to the extent the obligee proves that the in-
dorser or accommodation party did not suffer
loss. See Cal. Com. Code § 3605(d) (West
Supp. 2000).
Paragraph (3)(d)
Accord: Under California law, release of the collateral
securing the obligation of the principal obligor
will generally result in full exoneration of the
secondary obligor. See Wexler v. McLucas, 48
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Cal. App. 3d Supp. 9, 14, 121 Cal. Rptr. 453,
456 (1975); Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Os-
borne, 233 Cal. App. 2d 648, 663-64, 43 Cal.
Rptr. 761, 771 (1965). See also annotation to
section 42, regarding the discharge of a secon-
dary obligor upon a disposition of collateral
that does not comply with the requirements of
division 9 of the California Commercial Code.
See also Cal Com. Code § 9626 (West Supp.
1999).
If the obligation of a party under a negotiable
instrument is secured by collateral and the per-
son entitled to enforce such negotiable instru-
ment impairs the value of such collateral, the
obligation of an indorser or accommodation
party is discharged to the extent of the im-
pairment. See Cal. Com. Code § 3605(e)
(West Supp. 2000); see also In re Alcock, 50
F.3d 1456, 1460 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying
California law).
Paragraph (3)(e)
Contra: California has adopted the rule that the secon-
dary obligor is not discharged by the expira-
tion of the statute of limitations against the
principal obligor. See, e.g., Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Harford Accident & Indem.
Co., 21 Cal. 3d 624, 639, 581 P.2d 197, 206,
147 Cal. Rptr. 486, 495 (1978) (holding that
the failure of the creditor to file suit against
the principal within the applicable statute of
limitations period does not exonerate the sec-
ondary obligor, but the court's holding relied
in part on the former Restatement of the Lm
of Security).
Paragraph (3)69
Accord: Under California law, impairment of the right
of recourse against the principal obligor will
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Paragraph (a)
Accord: California Code of Civil Procedure section
877(b) provides that a release given before
judgment to one or more co-obligors mutually
LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 34:231
result in the complete exoneration of the sec-
ondary obligor. See, e.g., Union Bank v.
Gradsky, 265 Cal. App. 2d 40, 41, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 64, 69 (1968) (holding that the creditor
was estopped from pursuing the secondary
obligor for a deficiency after the creditor sold
property of the principal debtor subject to a
trust deed in a nonjudicial foreclosure sale that
prevented the secondary obligor from obtain-
ing a deficiency judgment against the principal
debtor).
Paragraph (4)(a) and (b)
Contra: A secondary obligor, as a person entitled to
receive notification of any disposition of col-
lateral under division 9 of the California
Commercial Code, has a right to recover from
the secured party any loss caused by the fail-
ure of such disposition to comply with the
provisions of that division. See Cal. Com.
Code § 9507(1) (West 1990); U.C.C. § 9-618
(1999) (stating that a secondary obligor ac-
quires the rights of the secured party upon an
assignment of a secured obligation, a transfer
of collateral or subrogation to the rights of the
secured party); see also U.C.C. § 9-618(a) of
Revised Article 9 (Supp. 1999).
Section 38- Preservation of Secondary Obligor's Recourse
Paragraphs (1) and (2)
No relevant California authority.
Section 39- Release of Underlying Obligation
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subject to contribution rights discharges the
released party from liability for contribution to
any other co-obligors. See Cal. Civ. Proc.
Code § 877(b) (West Supp. 2000).
Paragraph (b)
Accord: A discharge of a secondary obligor was ef-
fected where the principal obligor was no
longer required to assign invoices to obligee.
See Cal. Civ. Code § 2819 (West Supp. 2000);
Texaco Ref. & Mktg., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur
Co., 895 F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir. 1990) (ap-
plying California law).
Paragraph (b)(i)
No relevant California authority.
Paragraph (b)(ii)
Contra: Without the consent of the secondary obligor,
the intention of the obligee to retain its claim
against the secondary obligor would not be
sufficient to preserve such a claim. See Cal.
Civ. Code § 2819 (West Supp. 2000). One
court has, however, found implied consent
when a change in the principal obligation was
done for the benefit of the secondary obligor.
See Fruit Growers Supply Co. v. Goss, 4 Cal.
App. 2d 651, 655, 41 P.2d 357, 359 (1935).
Paragraph (c) (i)
Accord: Section 2822 of the California Civil Code pro-
vides that the acceptance by a creditor of any-
thing in partial satisfaction of an obligation re-
duces the obligation of a secondary obligor in
the same measure as that of the principal, but
does not otherwise affect it. See Cal. Civ.
Code § 2822 (West Supp. 2000); see also T&R
Painting Constr., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Ma-
rine Ins. Co., 23 Cal. App. 4th 738, 747, 29
Cal. Rptr. 2d 199, 203-04 (1994).
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Paragraph (c)(ii)
Accord: The discharge of an obligation of a party obli-
gated to pay a negotiable instrument does not
discharge the obligation of an indorser or ac-
commodation party having the right of re-
course against the discharged party. See Cal.
Com. Code § 3605(b) (West Supp. 2000); see
also id. § 3605 cmt. 3 (noting that the release
of the borrower on its note does not affect the
right of the accommodation party to obtain
reimbursement from the borrower or to en-
force the note against the borrower if the ac-
commodation party has paid the amount due
on the note).
Contra: Under California law, an agreement by the
obligee to accept from the principal obligor
less than the balance owed on the obligation
without the consent of the secondary obligor
will not exonerate the secondary obligor for
the lesser sum agreed upon by the obligee and
the principal obligor. See Cal. Civ. Code §
2822(b) (West Supp. 2000).
Paragraph (c)(ii)
Contra: A release of a material duty of the principal
obligor will effect an exoneration of the sec-
ondary obligor. See Cal. Civ. Code § 2819
(West Supp. 2000).
Paragraph (d)
No relevant California authority.
Section 40- Extension of Time
Paragraph (a)
Contra: Under California law, an extension of time for
a definite term serves as a material change to
the underlying obligation and therefore will
generally discharge a secondary obligor. See
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Paragraph (b)
Accord:
Paragraph (c)
Contra:
Paragraph (d)
Wise v. Clapper, 257 Cal. App. 2d 770, 774,
65 Cal Rptr. 231, 233 (1968) ("[A]n extension
of time of payment without the consent of the
surety constitutes a material alteration of the
original obligation and discharges the
surety."); see also Daneri v. Gazzola, 139 Cal.
416, 418, 73 P. 179, 180 (1903) (stating that
extension of time with respect to the principal
obligation, among other things, exonerated
secondary obligor); State Bd. of Equalization
v. Carleton, 223 Cal. App. 3d 1607, 1610, 273
Cal Rptr. 436, 438 (1990) (stating that an
agreement to extend time is deemed a material
alteration that causes the discharge of the sec-
ondary obligor, although court found that the
secondary obligor had consented to such al-
teration).
See Cal Com. Code § 3605(c) (West Supp.
2000) (stating that a discharge also applies to
indorsers and accommodation parties regard-
ing negotiable instruments). See annotation to
section 40(a). Note, however, that California
law generally contemplates a complete dis-
charge of the secondary obligor, while the Re-
statement of Suretyship provides a discharge
only to the extent that the secondary obligor
has suffered a loss.
See annotation in section 40(a). California
law does not address changes (other than a
complete discharge) in the scope of the duties
owing by the secondary obligor regarding the
secondary obligation because of the general
rule of complete discharge of the secondary
obligation, as noted above.
No relevant California authority.
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Section 41 - Modification of Underlying Obligation
Paragraph (a)
No relevant California authority.
Paragraph (b)(i)
Accord: Material alterations of the principal obligation
may result in the exoneration of the secondary
obligor. See Texaco Ref & Mktg., Inc. v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 895 F.2d 637, 639 (9th
Cir. 1990) (applying California law); ITT Di-
versified Credit Corp. v. Highlands Ins. Co.,
191 Cal. App. 3d 301, 305-06, 236 Cal. Rptr.
433, 436 (1987). California applies a much
broader discharge rule, which exonerates a
secondary obligor in the absence of consent
when the underlying obligation is materially
altered by the obligee. See Cal. Civ. Code §
2819 (West Supp. 2000). See general com-
ment to sections 34 through 49.
Contra: Section 2824 of the California Civil Code pro-
vides that alterations in the risks imposed on
secondary obligors that otherwise would effect
an exoneration will not do so if the principal
obligor has indemnified the secondary obligor.
See Cal. Civ. Code § 2824 (West 1993). Such
an indemnity must be greater than a mere
agreement to provide an indemnity; the secon-
dary obligor must have received "'the indem-
nified amount, physical collateral or a lien on
property."' Texaco Ref. & Mktg., 895 F.2d at
640 (applying California law and quoting with
approval the district court record).
Paragraph (b)(ii)
Accord: Modifications of the duties of the principal
obligor not of a fundamental nature may nev-
ertheless result in the exoneration of the sec-
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ondary obligor under section 2819 of the Cali-
fornia Civil Code. See Cal. Civ. Code § 2819
(West Supp. 2000). Such modifications must
generally be of a material nature. See ITT Di-
versified Credit Corp. v. Highlands Ins. Co.,
191 Cal. App. 3d 301, 305, 236 Cal. Rptr. 433,
436 (1987); Verdugo Highlands, Inc. v. Sec.
Ins. Co., 240 Cal. App. 2d 527, 530, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 736, 739 (1966). Further, such modifi-
cations are not required to be of a prejudicial
nature in order to effect the exoneration of the
secondary obligor. See Hill & Morton, Inc. v.
Coughlan, 214 Cal. App. 2d 545, 548, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 550, 552 (1963). California law varies
from the Restatement with respect to the ex-
tent of the measure of relief afforded a secon-
dary obligor; however, under the applicable
circumstances, section 2824 of the California
Civil Code provides that alterations in the
risks imposed on secondary obligors that oth-
erwise would effect an exoneration will not do
so if the principal obligor has indemnified the
secondary obligor. See Cal. Civ. Code § 2824
(West 1993). Such an indemnity must be
greater than a mere agreement to provide an
indemnity; the secondary obligor must have
received "'the indemnified amount, the physi-
cal collateral or a lien on property.1" Texaco
Ref & Mktg., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
895 F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying
California law and quoting with approval the
district court record).
Paragraph (c)(i)
Contra: Generally, a material modification of the prin-
cipal obligation will exonerate a secondary
obligor. See comments to subsection (b) and
above. The instance where the secondary ob-
ligation is modified (part payment) is excluded
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from the scope of this section. See comments
to section 39 above regarding section 2822 of
the California Civil Code regarding partial
payment.
Paragraph (c)(i)
Contra: Generally, a material modification of the prin-
cipal obligation will exonerate a secondary
obligor. See comments to subsection (b)
above. As California law does not generally
contemplate the situation where material
modifications of the underlying obligation do
not exonerate the secondary obligor, the as-
sumptions underlying the rule in this subsec-
tion are not directly applicable in California.
Paragraph (d)
No relevant California authority.
Section 42 - Impairment of Collateral
Paragraph (1)
Accord: The California Civil Code and the Restatement
of Suretyship agree that a secondary obligor
may be discharged if the obligee impairs the
collateral securing an underlying obligation.
The Restatement of Suretyship differs in that it
discharges the secondary obligor only to the
extent of the impairment. See general com-
ment to sections 34 through 49. Pursuant to
the California Civil Code, a secondary obligor
is entitled to the benefit of every security for.
the performance of the principal obligation
held by the principal obligor, or by a cosurety
at the time of entering into the contract of
suretyship or acquired by the principal obligee
or cosurety afterwards, whether the secondary
obligor was aware of the suretyship or not.
See Cal. Civ. Code § 2849 (West 1993). Im-
pairment of the rights set forth in section 2849
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of the California Civil Code results in the ex-
oneration of the secondary obligor entirely:
"By releasing the security, the [obligee] has
also released the surety." Wexler it McLucas,
48 Cal App. 3d 9, 14, 121 Cal. Rptr. 453, 456
(1975); see also Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co. v.
Osborne, 233 Cal. App. 2d 648, 663, 43 Cal.
Rptr. 761, 771 (1965). Please note that this
section of the Restatement of Suretyship and
California law are inconsistent regarding the
measure of relief afforded a secondary obligor
when an impairment of collateral occurs.
Paragraphs (2)(a) - (c)
Accord: See CaL Com. Code § 3605 (e), (f) (West 1964
& Supp. 1999); see also In re Alcock, 50 F.3d
1456 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying California
law).
Paragraph (2)(d)
Accord: See Cal. Com. Code § 3605 (e), (f) (West 1964
& Supp. 1999); see also In re Alcock, 50 F.3d
1456 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying California
law). Intermediate appellate authorities ap-
plying California law have treated secondary
obligors as having the rights of "debtors" un-
der the California Commercial Code with re-
spect to notices and the requirement of com-
mercial reasonableness in the disposition of
collateral thereunder. Sections 9610 and 9611
of revised division 9 provide guidelines for the
disposition of collateral and the notification
requirements thereof for persons including
debtors. In the absence of an enforceable,
predefault waiver by a secondary obligor
(which is problematic under California Com-
mercial Code section 9501(3)), under section
9504(c) of the California Commercial Code,
failure of the obligee-secured party to effect a
disposition of collateral in compliance with the
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specified conditions of section 9504(c) would
adjust the liability of the principal obligor and
the secondary obligor generally in accordance
with the precepts of this section of the Re-
statement of Suretyship. See Cal. Corn. Code
§ 9504 (West Supp. 1999). Section 9507 of
the California Commercial Code also provides
a debtor or other person entitled to notice
(which includes a secondary obligor) the right
to recover a loss from the obligee. See Cal.
Corn. Code § 9507 (West 1964); Cal. Com.
Code § 9626(a) (West Supp. 1999). See an-
notation to Section 48.
Contra: Section 9504(b) and section 9504(d) of the
California Commercial Code provide for the
complete discharge of the debtor (including
the secondary obligor) under the conditions
specified therein. See Cal. Com. Code §
9504(b), (d) (West Supp. 1999).
Section 43 - Delay in Enforcement; Running of the Statute of
Limitations as to Underlying Obligation
Contra: California has generally adopted the rule that
the secondary obligor is not discharged by the
expiration of the statute of limitations against
the principal obligor. See, e.g., Bloom v.
Bender, 48 Cal. 2d 793, 798, 313 P.2d 568,
571 (1957) ("[I]n California, the obligation of
[surety] on [the] continuing obligation is not
barred merely because the statute of limita-
tions had run against the obligation of the
principal debtor.").
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Section 44 - Other Inpairnent of Recourse
Accord: Under California law, impairment of recourse
that would cause a secondary obligor a loss
may result in the exoneration of the secondary
obligor. See, e.g., Union Bank v. Gradsk,,
265 CaL App. 2d 40, 71 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1968).
In Union Bank, after default by principal obli-
gor on the primary obligation, obligee sold, at
a nonjudicial foreclosure sale, real property of
the principal obligor that was the subject of a
trust deed in favor of the obligee. See id. at
41, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 65. Thereafter, obligee
brought suit against secondary obligor to re-
cover a deficiency judgment. See id. at 42, 71
Cal. Rptr. at 66. The obligee was estopped
from obtaining a deficiency judgment against
the secondary obligor under such circum-
stances because the obligee had destroyed its
own right, as well as the right of the secondary
obligor, to obtain a deficiency from the princi-
pal obligor in accordance with section 580d of
the California Code of Civil Procedure. See
id. at 45-46, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 67-69; see also
Commonwealth Mortgage Assurance Co. v.
Superior Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d 508, 259
Cal. Rptr. 425 (1989). While impairment of
recourse under this section of the Restatement
of Suretyship also results in a discharge of the
secondary obligor, the extent of the discharge
is not necessarily complete, but rather is based
on the nature of the impairment as is more
fully set forth in this section.
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Section 45- Secondary Obligation of Seller of Right to Collect
Money
Other: Although California law does not address di-
rectly the issues that this section addresses,
secondary obligors generally have the rights of
a debtor with respect to the disposition of col-
lateral under division 9 of the California
Commercial Code. See annotation to section
42.
Section 46- Tender of Performance
Accord: Section 2839 of the California Civil Code
states that performance of the principal obli-
gation, or an offer of such performance, duly
made as provided in the Code, exonerates a
secondary obligor. See Cal. Civ. Code § 2839
(West 1993).
Paragraph (1)(a)
Accord: See Daneri v. Gazzola, 139 Cal. 416, 73 P.
179 (1903). Where the principal maker of a
note offered to pay, and the payee declined to
accept the payment, but granted an extension
without the consent of the secondary obligors,
the secondary obligors were released. See id.
at 418, 73 P. at 180. Such refusal constituted a
"breach of good faith" toward the secondary
obligors, and their interests were "imperiled"
by the wrongful acts of the creditor. Id.
(quoting Curiac v. Packard, 29 Cal. 194, 197
(1865)).
Paragraph (2)(a)
Accord: See O'Connor v. Morse, 112 Cal. 31, 44 P.
305 (1896). In an action on a non-negotiable
note that was held by plaintiff creditor as col-
lateral security for another obligation, one co-
maker paid one-third of the balance on the
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note and offered to pay the remainder, but the
creditor refused to accept the payment. See id.
at 36-37, 44 P. at 306. The comaker who of-
fered to pay was then released from liability to
the creditor upon the subsequent insolvency of
the remaining comakers. See id. at 37-38, 44
P. at 307.
Section 47- Obligee's Nondisclosure of Events Giving Secon-
dary Obligor Power to Terminate Secondary Obligation
Accord: See Sumitomo Bank v. Iwasaki, 70 Cal. 2d 81,
447 P.2d 956, 73 Cal. Rptr. 564 (1968). The
court expressly adopted the rule set forth in the
Restatement of Security that a creditor owes a
duty to a secondary obligor to disclose facts
known to the creditor if (1) the creditor has
reason to believe that (a) those facts materially
increase the risk beyond that which the secon-
dary obligor intended to assume and (b) those
facts are unknown to the secondary obligor,
and (2) the creditor has a reasonable opportu-
nity to communicate the facts. See id. at 90,
447 P.2d at 963, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 571. Failure
to disclose such facts to the secondary obligor
prior to an extension of further credit to the
debtor will discharge the secondary obligor
from liability on the subsequent loan if the
foregoing conditions are satisfied. See id. at
93, 447 P.2d at 965, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 573.
Section 48- Waiver of Suretyship Defenses; Consent
Accord: California law has long been consistent with
the Restatement of Suretyship rule that a sec-
ondary obligor can (1) consent in advance to
acts that would otherwise reduce or discharge
the secondary obligor's liability, (2) agree that
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such reductions or discharges will be unavail-
able to the secondary obligor, and (3) waive
the suretyship defenses that would give rise to
such reductions or discharges. Citing Re-
statement of Security section 6 for the propo-
sition that, under the common law, agreements
may waive suretyship defenses, Mead v.
Sanwa Bank California, 61 Cal. App. 4th 561,
571 n.2, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 625, 631 n.2 (1998),
stated: "[A]s the Supreme Court noted long
ago [in 1880] in Harlan v. Ely, it is possible
for a surety to bargain away the rights of
suretyship and agree with a creditor to be li-
able as a principal." See also Bloom v.
Bender, 48 Cal. 2d 793, 804, 313 P.2d 568,
575 (1957); River Bank Am. v. Diller, 38 Cal.
App. 4th 1400, 1413-19, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790,
796-800 (1995); Union Bank v. Gradsky, 265
Cal. App. 2d 40, 71 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1968). In
addition, some of the statutes that provide
suretyship defenses expressly recognize
waiver of the protections available thereunder.
See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 2819 (West Supp.
1999). Moreover, the California legislature
codified the broad general rule of waivability
in Civil Code section 2856 in 1994, and ex-
panded that section in 1996 to further under-
score and clarify the ability of a secondary ob-
ligor to waive all defenses, whether arising
under statutory or common law. See id. §
2856.
Consent may be express or implied from the
circumstances and, if express, such consent,
agreement or waiver may be effectuated by
specific language or by general language indi-
cating the waiver. No particular formula or
extraordinary mode of expression is required.
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See particularly comments b and d to section
48 of the Restatement of Suretship. Califor-
nia law is fully in accord. See Cal. Civ. Code
§ 2856 (West Supp. 2000); see also Sanwa
Bank Cal., 61 Cal. App. 4th at 571 n.2, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 631 n.2.
All three techniques (advance consent, agree-
ment, and waiver) for achieving the result of
relinquishment of suretyship defenses are
permitted and are governed by the same stan-
dards. Nevertheless, because of the drafting
convention of using express waivers, a few
courts sought to apply rules from other areas
of law that would require the document creat-
ing the secondary obligation to go beyond or-
dinary contract principles to demonstrate that
the waivers were explicit and knowing. See,
e.g., Cathay Bank v. Lee, 14 Cal. App. 4th
1533, 18 CaL Rptr. 2d 420 (1993). Requiring
detailed waivers, explanations of their signifi-
cance, or separate identification of each
ground for discharge would have significantly
lengthened most standard form guaranties and
probably have rendered them less understand-
able to most readers. Moreover, such a re-
quirement was inconsistent with the prior
trend under California law, which held that no
particular form of language is required for an
enforceable waiver of suretyship defenses and
which tended, under ordinary contract princi-
ples, to enforce the intent of the parties as ex-
pressed in their agreement. See, e.g., Bloom,
48 Cal. 2d at 804, 313 P.2d at 575; River
Bank, 38 Cal. App. 4th at 1413-19, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 796-800; Am. Sec. Bank v. Clarno,
151 Cal. App. 3d 874, 882, 199 Cal. Rptr. 127,
132 (1984); Union Bank v. Ross, 54 Cal. App.
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3d 290, 294, 126 Cal. Rptr. 646, 648 (1976);
Brunswick Corp. v. Hays, 16 Cal. App. 3d
134, 138-39, 93 Cal. Rptr. 635, 638 (1971);
Wiener v. Van Winkle, 273 Cal. App. 2d 774,
786-87, 78 Cal. Rptr. 761, 768-69 (1969).
When the legislature expanded Civil Code
section 2856 in 1996, it made clear that any
language that expresses an intent to waive
suretyship rights and defenses is effective even
though it does not include any particular lan-
guage, phrases, or references to statutory pro-
visions or judicial decisions. See Cal. Civ.
Code § 2856 (West Supp. 2000). The legisla-
ture, in effect, overruled Cathay Bank and
made clear that California law is fully in ac-
cord with the Restatement of Suretyship.
Notwithstanding the above-described broad
waivability of suretyship defenses under Cali-
fornia suretyship law and under section 48 of
the Restatement of Suretyship, one should bear
in mind the nonwaivability, before default, of
certain rights by secondary obligors support-
ing an obligation secured by personal property
in transactions governed by division 9 of the
California Commercial Code. In these cir-
cumstances, the California courts have treated
guarantors as "debtors" entitled to the protec-
tions afforded under chapter 5 of division 9 to
debtors after default, including having the
benefit of the rule of nonwaivability by debt-
ors of the rights enumerated in California
Commercial Code section 9501(3). See, e.g.,
Hollander v. Cal. Mfg. Enter., Inc., 44 Cal.
App. 4th 561, 569, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694, 698
(1996); C.LT. Corp. v. Anwright Corp., 191
Cal. App. 3d 1420, 1425-26, 237 Cal. Rptr.
108, 111-12 (1987); Connolly v. Bank of
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Sonoma Count, 184 Cal App. 3d 1119, 1125,
229 Cal. Rptr. 396, 400 (1986). This non-
waivability rule is not an exception to the
suretyship law discussed above, as it is a sepa-
rate body of division 9 rights (not suretyship
rights) that are nonwaivable. To the extent
that a particular act by the secured party (who
is also the beneficiary of the guaranty) would
give rise to both a nonwaivable defense under
division 9 and a waivable suretyship defense,
an effective waiver of the suretyship defense
does not, of course, waive the defense under
division 9. This subject is dealt with in greater
precision by revised division 9, section 9701.
The enumeration of nonwaivable rights under
revised division 9 is found in revised division
9, section 9602; revised division 9, section
9624, authorizing certain postdefault waivers,
provides a limited exception thereto. See also
Cal. Com. Code § 9628 (West Supp. 1999)
(relieving a secured party from liability and
from loss of its right to collect a deficiency
when the secured party does not know that a
person is a secondary obligor or does not
know the person's identity or how to commu-
nicate with the person). Revised division 9
carefully distinguishes among debtors, obli-
gors, and secondary obligors. All three terms
are defined in revised division 9, section 9102,
and official comment 2a to that section pro-
vides a useful discussion of the classifications.
All secondary obligors within the meaning of
division 9 are secondary obligors within the
meaning of the Restatement of Suretyship and
as used in this Report, but the reverse is not
true. See id.
Paragraph (2)
No relevant California authority.
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Section 49 - Burden of Persuasion With Respect to Impair-
ment of Recourse
Contra: Section 2837 of the California Civil Code
suggests that California law does not distin-
guish between gratuitous and compensated
secondary obligors in regard to the burden of
persuasion with respect to impairment of re-
course. See Cal. Civ. Code § 2837 (West
1993). Section 3605 of the California Com-
mercial Code, subsections (c), (d), (e), and (f),
also establishes different burdens of persua-
sion depending upon the alleged nature of the
impairment. See Cal. Com. Code § 3605
(West Supp. 1999); see also id. § 3605 cmts.
3-7; PEB Commentary No. 11, 3B U.L.A. 126
(Supp. 1999). Note: The distinction drawn by
this section in allocating the burden of persua-
sion is not only between gratuitous and com-
pensated secondary obligors. See Comment b.
Section 50 - Effect on Secondary Obligation of Obligee's Lack
ofAction to Enforce Underlying Obligation
Paragraph (1)
Accord: Section 2823 of the California Civil Code pro-
vides that mere delay by an enforcing creditor
will not exonerate a secondary obligor. See
Cal. Civ. Code § 2823 (West 1993). An omis-
sion by a creditor, as opposed to mere delay,
may discharge the secondary obligor. See id.
§ 2845; Shank v. Blackburn, 53 Cal. App. 620,
625, 200 P. 762, 765 (1921); Bridge v. Conn.
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 Cal. 774, 782, 141 P.
375, 379 (1914). But cf. Humphreys v. Crane,
5 Cal. 173, 175 (1855) (stating that an agree-
ment to extend the time for performance alters
CALIFORNIA COMMENTARY
the original agreement and may discharge the
secondary obligor).
Section 51 - Wizen Obligee Must First Seek to Collect by
Applying Collateral for Underlying Obligation
Paragraph (1)
Contra: Section 2849 of the Civil Code provides that a
secondary obligor is entitled to the benefit of
every security for the performance of the prin-
cipal obligation held by the creditor, or by a
cosurety, at the time of entering into the sure-
tyship contract or acquired by the cosurety,
whether the secondary obligor was aware of
the security or not. See Cal. Civ. Code § 2849
(West 1993); see also Eppinger v. Kendrick,
114 Cal. 620, 46 P. 613 (1896) (stating that if
the creditor fails to sell the property provided
by the debtor, after being instructed to do so,
the secondary obligor will be released from its
obligation). In Sukut-Coulson, Inc. v. Allied
Cannon Co., 85 Cal. App. 3d 648, 654-55, 149
Cal. Rptr. 711, 715-16 (1978), a secondary
obligor that did not demand that the obligee
pursue other remedies, but rather denied li-
ability, was not entitled to the benefit of sec-
tion 2849. Section 2845 of the California
Civil Code provides that a secondary obligor
may require a creditor, subject to section
996.440 of the California Code of Civil Proce-
dure, to proceed against the principal or to
pursue any other remedy in the creditor's
power, which the secondary obligor cannot
pursue and which would lighten the secondary
obligor's burden. See Cal. Civ. Code § 2845
(West 1993). Under Everts i. Matteson, 21
Cal. 2d 437, 441, 132 P.2d 476, 481 (1942),
section 2845 was held to permit a secondary
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obligor on a real-property secured loan to re-
quire the creditor to foreclose on the property
before collecting from the secondary obligor.
See id. Section 2850 of the California Civil
Code provides that a secondary obligor is en-
titled to have collateral of the principal obligor
applied to discharge the obligation before re-
sorting to the collateral of the secondary obli-
gor. See Cal. Civ. Code § 2850 (West 1993).
Section 52- Multiple Secondary Obligors--General Principle
Accord: There is no California authority directly on
point, but see Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 877
(West Supp. 2000) (stating that a release given
to one or more co-obligors mutually subject to
contribution, such as cosureties, does not dis-
charge any other obligor from liability, but re-
duces the obligee's claims against the other
co-obligors by the amount of the consideration
paid for the release or, if greater, the amount
stipulated in the release, i.e., amounts received
by the obligee from one co-obligor reduce its
total claim against the other co-obligors).
California Code of Civil Procedure section
877 also provides that such a release dis-
charges the released obligor from liability for
contribution to any other co-obligor. See id. §
877(b).
Section 53- Distinguishing Cosuretyship From Suretyship
Paragraph (1)
Accord: In Continental Casualty Co. v. Hartford Acci-
dent & Indemnity Co., 243 Cal. App. 2d 565,
52 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1966), the court stated:
Under some circumstances two per-
sons may be cosureties for the same
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Paragraph (2)
Accord:
Paragraph (3)
Accord:
Paragraph (4)
Accord:
debt and may be required to share the
loss, even when their liabilities origi-
nate in separate contracts. On the
other hand, if one of them in equity
should bear the ultimate burden rather
than the other, they stand in the posi-
tion of successive sureties.
Id. (citations omitted).
See Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Harqford Accident &
Indem. Co., 243 CaL App. 2d 565, 570, 52
CaL Rptr. 533, 537 (1966) (ruling that whether
secondary obligors are cosureties or succes-
sive secondary obligors depends upon the in-
ferences to be drawn from their contracts and
the circumstances of the case); see also Booth
v. Friedman, 82 Cal. App. 174, 178-79, 255 P.
222, 224 (1927) (holding that absent agree-
ment of signers, cosureties are proportionately
liable for the obligation).
Section 2848 of the California Civil Code pro-
vides that a secondary obligor, upon satisfying
the obligation of the principal, is entitled to
require all cosureties to contribute thereto,
without regard to the order in which they be-
came cosureties. See Cal. Civ. Code § 2848
(West 1993). In Continental Casualty Co. v.
Har#ford Accident & Indemnity Co., 243 Cal.
App. 2d 565, 570-71, 52 Cal. Rptr. 533, 537
(1966), the court stated, "[i]f the first of two
successive sureties is forced to pay the debt,
he is subrogated to the creditor's rights upon
the bond and may enforce it against the second
surety."
See Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Harford Accident &
Indem. Co., 243 Cal. App. 2d 565, 52 Cal.
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Rptr. 533 (1966) (holding, on facts substan-
tially similar to those of Illustration 8, that in
equity, the secondary obligor for the subcon-
tractor was a successive secondary obligor,
rather than a cosurety, of the secondary obli-
gor for the contractor and should bear the ul-
timate burden of the subcontractor's default).
Section 54 - Effect of Impairment of Secondary Obligor's
Recourse Against Another Secondary Obligor
Contra: The general rule in California is that release of
a cosurety who is jointly and severally liable
does not exonerate a secondary obligor. See
Cal. Civ. Code § 1543 (West Supp. 2000)
(stating that in general, a release of one of two
or more joint debtors does not extinguish the
obligations of any of the others, unless they
are mere secondary obligors of the obligations
of the joint debtor released); Cal. Civ. Proc.
Code § 877 (West Supp. 2000) (stating that a
release given to one or more co-obligors mu-
tually subject to contribution, such as cosure-
ties, does not discharge any other co-obligor
from liability, but reduces the obligee's claims
against the other co-obligors by the amount of
the consideration paid for the release or, if
greater, the amount stipulated in the release);
Wristen v. Curtis, 76 Cal. 6, 7, 18 P. 81, 82
(1888); Oil Tool Exch., Inc. v. Schuh, 67 Cal.
App. 2d 288, 296, 153 P.2d 976, 981 (1944).
Section 55 - Rights Between Secondary Obligors-Cosurety-
ship
Paragraph (1)
Accord: See Cal. Civ. Code § 2848 (West 1993);
Hosking v. Spartan Props., Inc., 275 Cal. App.
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Paragraph (2)
Paragraph (2)
Accord:
Section 56 -
Cosuretyship
Paragraph (1)
2d 152, 157, 79 Cal. Rptr. 893, 896 (1969);
Jackson v. Lacy, 37 Cal. App. 2d 551, 559-60,
100 P.2d 313, 317-18 (1940).
See generally the annotation to section 54.
Under section 2848 of the California Civil
Code, a secondary obligor, "upon satisfying
the obligation of the principal, is entitled.., to
require all of his or her cosureties to contribute
thereto, without regard to the order in which
they became [cosureties]." See Cal. Civ. Code
§ 2848 (West 1993); see also Jackson i. Lac,,
37 Cal. App. 2d 551, 559-60, 100 P.2d 313,
317-18 (1940).
Compare Cal. Civ. Code § 2849 (West 1993)
(providing, in pertinent part, that a cosurety is
entitled to the benefit of every security for the
performance of the principal obligation held
by a cosurety), with Williams v. Riehl, 127
Cal. 365, 59 P. 762 (1899) (holding that co-
sureties who received an assignment of a
judgment in exchange for a payment of less
than the full amount of the judgment could en-
force the assigned judgment against their co-
sureties only to the extent of their respective
contributive shares of the amount paid for the
assignment). But see annotations to section
27, discussing the conflict in California re-
garding subrogation rights.
Cosuretyship-Defenses Against Claim of
See generally the annotation to section 54.
See also Overholser v. Glynn, 267 Cal. App.
2d 800, 809, 73 Cal. Rptr. 628, 634 (1968)
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Paragraph (2)
(holding that a release by one cosurety of
rights of contribution against another cosurety
does not affect the liability of the nonreleased
cosureties for contribution).
No relevant California authority.
Section 57- Cosurety's Contributive Share
Paragraph (1)
Accord:
Paragraph (2)
Accord:
See Booth v. Friedman, 82 Cal. App. 174,
178-79, 255 P. 222, 224 (1927).
In Williams v. Riehl, 127 Cal. 365, 372, 59 P.
762, 765 (1899), the court noted that the gen-
eral rule of recovering a proportionate share
from all cosureties is altered if any of the co-
sureties are insolvent, and the burden will be
placed on the solvent secondary obligors. But
see Alberding v. Brunzell, 601 F.2d 474 (9th
Cir. 1979) (a Ninth Circuit case appealed from
the District Court of Nevada applying Califor-
nia law regarding suretyship issues, in which
the court determined that the general rule re-
garding absent or insolvent cosureties did not
apply because the cosureties could have all
been sued in a jurisdiction where all cosureties
could have been made parties).
Section 58 - Right of Contributing Cosurety With Respect to
Principal Obligor
Paragraph (1)
Accord:
Paragraph (2)
Accord:
See Williams v. Riehl, 127 Cal. 365, 371, 59 P.
762, 764-65 (1899).
See Williams v. Riehl, 127 Cal. 365, 59 P. 762
(1899) (the holding of which is consistent with
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the principles described in comment (e) to this
section).
Section 59 - Rights Betveen Secondary Obligors--Subsurety-
ship
No relevant California authority.
Section 60 - Subsuretyship-Defenses Against Claim of
Subsurety
No relevant California authority.
Section 61 - Right of Principal Surety With Respect to Princi-
pal Obligor
No relevant California authority.
Section 62 - Accrual of Secondary Obligor's Cause of Action
Against Principal Obligor for Reimbursement or Restitution
Accord: California cases addressing this issue gener-
ally focus on the accrual of the cause of action
on the date of the secondary obligor's per-
formance. See, e.g., Davies v. Torrance, 188
CaL 179, 180, 204 P. 820, 820 (1922) (holding
that a corporation's indebtedness to the secon-
dary obligors on its note accrues at the time
they paid the note); Stone v. Hammell, 83 Cal.
547, 550, 23 P. 703, 704 (1890) (holding that
in order for a reimbursement action to accrue,
performance of the secondary obligation must
satisfy the claim of the obligee and extinguish
the debt of the principal obligor to the obli-
gee); Childs v. Stocker-LaBrea Props., Inc., 9
Cal. App. 3d 276, 279, 88 Cal. Rptr. 34, 36
(1970) (holding that secondary obligor could
bring suit against maker of note if and when
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secondary obligor was required to make good
on his guarantee of note). Although no Cali-
fornia case addresses the situation in which the
secondary obligor performed its obligations
prior to the date for performance of the un-
derlying obligation, one California court has
stated that a secondary obligor is not entitled
to reimbursement, contribution, or subrogation
on account of payments made to the obligee
unless it appears that such payments were
made under a legal compulsion and not as a
mere volunteer. See Schlitz v. Thomas, 61 Cal.
App. 635, 638, 216 P. 51, 52 (1923). This re-
quirement, when considered together with the
well-settled principle that an obligee's cause
of action against a secondary obligor accrues
at the same time the cause of action accrues
against the principal obligor, leads to the con-
clusion that, under California law, a secondary
obligor cannot seek reimbursement or restitu-
tion for payments in respect of a secondary
obligation until the principal obligation be-
comes due and payable. See, e.g., Bloom v.
Bender, 48 Cal. 2d 793, 798, 313 P.2d 568,
571 (1957); Cal. First Bank v. Braden, 216
Cal. App. 3d 672, 677, 264 Cal. Rptr. 820, 822
(1989).
Section 63 - Accrual of Cause of Action Against Cosurety or
Principal Surety for Reimbursement or Restitution
Paragraph (1)
Accord: California cases addressing this issue gener-
ally focus on the accrual of the cause of action
on the date on which the cosurety's perform-
ance first exceeds its contributive share. See,
e.g., Hurlbut v. Quigley, 180 Cal. 265, 271,
180 P. 613, 615 (1919) (holding that a cause
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of action for contribution accrues when one
secondary obligor pays more than his share of
the principal obligation); Overholser v. Glynn,
267 Cal. App. 2d 800, 807, 73 Cal. Rptr. 628,
632 (1968) (holding that where one of several
joint cosureties pays more than a proportionate
share of the principal obligation, the cosurety
is entitled to obtain a proportionate contribu-
tion from those jointly liable); see also Cal.
Civ. Code § 1432 (West Supp. 1999); Cal.
Civ. Code § 2848 (West 1993). There are no
California cases that focus on the accrual date
described in clause (b) of this section.
Paragraph (2)
No relevant California authority.
Section 64 - When Statute of Linitations Applicable to
Cosurety's or Principal Surety's Cause of Action Against
Principal Obligor Begins to Run
Accord: In Stone v. Hammell, 83 Cal. 547, 551, 23 P.
703, 704 (1890), the California Supreme Court
held that where, at the time a paying cosurety
received a promissory note from another co-
surety as a contribution payment, the statute of
limitations had expired on the paying cosur-
ety's cause of action for reimbursement
against the principal obligor, the statute of
limitations had also expired on the reimburse-
ment claim of the cosurety tendering the
promissory note.
Section 65 - Tolling of Statute of Limitations as to Principal
Obligor or Secondary Obligor Ineffective as to Other
Accord: "It is... settled that 'a payment by a principal
debtor will not operate to toll the statute of
limitations as to a guarantor."' R.N.C., Inc. v.
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Tsegeletos, 231 Cal. App. 3d 967, 971, 283
Cal. Rptr. 48, 50 (1991) (quoting Purdy v.
Maree, 31 Cal. App. 2d 125, 127, 87 P.2d 390,
391 (1939)).
Section 66 - Effect of Principal Obligor's Concealment of
Default on Statute of Limitations With Respect to Secondary
Obligation
Accord: It is well settled in California that where a
party is guilty of fraudulent concealment of a
cause of action, the statute of limitations is
deemed not to become operative until the ag-
grieved party discovers the cause of action.
See, e.g., Bollinger v. Nat ' Fire Ins. Co., 25
Cal. 2d 399, 411, 154 P.2d 399, 411 (1944);
Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc.,
43 Cal. App. 3d 880, 895-96, 118 Cal. Rptr.
370, 382 (1974). It is also well settled that an
obligee's cause of action against a secondary
obligor accrues at the same time as the cause
of action against the principal obligor. See,
e.g., Bloom v. Bender, 48 Cal. 2d 793, 798,
313 P.2d 568, 571 (1957); Cal. First Bank v.
Braden, 216 Cal. App. 3d 672, 676, 264 Cal.
Rptr. 820, 822 (1989).
Section 67- Preclusive Effect on Secondary Obligor of
Litigation Between Obligee and Principal Obligor
Paragraph (1)
No relevant California authority.
Paragraph (2)
Contra: Unless the secondary obligor, by the terms of
its undertaking, agrees to pay or become liable
for any judgment obtained against the princi-
pal obligor, the secondary obligor is not bound
by a judgment obtained in an action against
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Paragraph (3)
Accord:
the principal obligor where the secondary ob-
ligor is not a party to the record in such action.
See Mahana v. Alexander, 88 Cal. App. 111,
119-22, 263 P. 260, 263-65 (1927).
A default judgment against a principal obligor
is not binding on a secondary obligor, includ-
ing where the principal and secondary obligors
are named in the same action. See All Ban'
Mill & Lwnber Co. v. Sur. Co., 208 Cal. App.
3d 11, 17-18, 255 Cal Rptr. 790, 793-94
(1989).
Section 68 - Preclusive Effect on Principal Obligor of Litiga-
tion Between Obligee and Secondary Obligor
Paragraph (1)
Paragraph (2)
Accord.
No relevant California authority.
Section 1912 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure codifies this principle:
Whenever, pursuant to [California
Code of Civil Procedure sections 1908
through 1911], a party is bound by a
record, and such party stands in the
relation of a surety for another, the
latter is also bound from the time that
he has notice of the action or pro-
ceeding, and an opportunity at the
surety's request to join in the defense.
Cal Civ. Proc. Code § 1912 (West 1983); see
also Easton v. Boston hv. Co., 51 Cal. App.
246, 251-52, 196 P. 796, 798 (1921) (holding
that where deed of trust was executed to in-
demnify secondary obligor against loss or li-
ability arising under the bond, order in bank-
ruptcy proceedings against secondary obligor
allowing claim on the bond was not conclusive
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against grantor of deed of trust in action to
foreclose deed of trust by secondary obligor's
assignee).
Section 69- Third Party Beneficiaries of Secondary Obligor
Accord: As comment b to section 69 of the Restate-
ment of Suretyship indicates, the application of
this section commonly arises in the context of
construction contracts. Surety bonds are re-
quired to inure to the benefit of employees, la-
borers, material suppliers, or other persons
furnishing services or supplies. See Cal. Civ.
Code §§ 3181, 3248 (West 1993 & Supp.
1999). California courts have recognized
claims brought by such persons against the
secondary obligor that issued the payment
bond. See, e.g., L.A. Stone Co. v. Nat'l Sur.
Co., 178 Cal. 247, 173 P. 79 (1918); S. Heat-
ers Corp. v. N.Y Cas. Co., 120 Cal. App. 2d
377, 260 P.2d 1048 (1953); Pac. States Elec.
Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 109
Cal. App. 691, 293 P. 812 (1930); see also
Cal. Bus. & Prof Code § 7071.5 (West 1995
& Supp. 1997) (contractor's license bonds);
Bonjour, Gough & Stone v. Pac. Employers
Ins. Co. (In re Buna Painting & Drywall Co.),
503 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that li-
censing bonds required by California law as a
precondition to securing contractor's licenses
are essentially third-party beneficiary con-
tracts; the contractor does not have a property
interest in the bonds).
Section 70- When Obligation of Secondary Obligor Revives
No relevant California authority.
CALIFORNIA COMMENTARY
Section 71 - Legally Mandated Bonds-Generally
Paragraph (1)
Accord:
Paragraph (2)
Contra:
Section 995.020 of the California Code of
Civil Procedure provides that the provisions of
the Bond and Undertaking Law, California
Code of Civil Procedure sections 995.010-
.960, apply to a bond or undertaking executed,
filed, posted, furnished, or otherwise given as
security pursuant to any statute of the State of
California except to the extent the statute pre-
scribes a different rule or is inconsistent. See
Cal Civ. Proc. Code § 995.020 OVest Supp.
1999). Section 995.180 of the California Code
of Civil Procedure defines "statute" to include
administrative regulations promulgated pursu-
ant to statute. See id. § 995.180. Note: Per
California Code of Civil Procedure section
995.020(c), the provisions of the Bond and
Undertaking Law do not apply to bail bonds.
Section 996.470(b) of the California Code of
Civil Procedure provides that if a bond is
given in an amount in excess of that required
by the statute or order of the court or officer
pursuant to statute, the liability of the secon-
dary obligor is reduced to the amount required
by statute or order of the court or officer pur-
suant to statute, unless the excess is the result
of a voluntary agreement of the parties to sat-
isfy an objection to the bond under an action
or proceeding. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §
996.470(b) (West Supp. 1999).
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Section 72 - Ineligibility of Secondary Obligor on Legally
Mandated Bond; Noncompliance with Other Formalities
Accord: Section 995.380 of the California Code of
Civil Procedure provides that if a statutory
bond does not contain the substantial matter or
conditions required by law for such bond, or if
there are any defects in the giving or filing
thereof, the bond is not void, and the benefici-
ary may disregard the defect in the bond or its
giving or filing and enforce same against the
persons who intended to become and were in-
cluded as secondary obligors on the bond. See
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 995.380 (West Supp.
1999).
Section 73- Penalties
Accord: Section 996.470(a) of the California Code of
Civil Procedure provides that notwithstanding
the provisions of any other statute, other than
Civil Procedure Code section 996.480 re-
specting payment of costs of enforcement of
the bond (including attorneys' fees) and inter-
est on the judgment, the aggregate liability of
a secondary obligor to all persons for all
breaches of the condition of the bond is lim-
ited to the amount of the bond. See Cal. Civ.
Proc. Code § 996.470(a) (West Supp. 1999).
Other: Where a secondary obligor on a bond is a
party litigant to the underlying suit against the
principal and becomes liable for certain costs
as such party litigant, subdivision (a) of Cali-
fornia Code of Civil Procedure section
996.470 does not operate to preclude the
award of such costs against the secondary ob-
ligor. See Harris v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins.
CALIFORNIA COMMENTARY
Co., 6 CaL App. 4th 1061, 1066, 8 Cal. Rptr.
2d 234, 237 (1992). The court, in imposing
such costs against the secondary obligor in
Harris stated that subdivision (a) of California
Code of Civil Procedure section 996.470 only
deals with liability for a breach of the condi-
tion of the bond and does not limit liability of
the secondary obligor imposed by statute
rather than for a breach of the condition of the
bond. The court cited California Code of Civil
Procedure section 996.475, which provides
that "[n]othing in this chapter is intended to
limit the liability of a surety pursuant to any
other statute. This section is declaratory of,
and not a change in, existing law." Id. at
1065, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 237; see Cal. Civ.
Proc. Code § 996.470 (West Supp. 1999).
Section 74- Fidelity Coverage
Accord: In Guardian Fire & Life Assurance Co. v.
Thompson, 68 Cal. 208, 208-09, 9 P. 1, 1
(1885), defendant secondary obligor company
provided a bond to plaintiff insurance com-
pany to assure payment to plaintiff of sums
collected as insurance premiums by plaintiff's
local insurance agent. The plaintiff knew that
the principal obligor had defrauded plaintiff in
the past, but failed to disclose that informa-
tion. See id. at 209, 9 P. at 1. The court stated
that continuing the agent in service was
equivalent to a declaration that the principal
had no knowledge of the dishonesty of the
agent. See id. at 210, 9 P. at 2. Accordingly,
plaintiff insurance company was denied any
collection on the fidelity bond. See id.; see
also W. Am. Fin. Co. v. Pac. Indem. Co., 17
Cal. App. 2d 225, 61 P.2d 963 (1936).
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